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AVOIDING DEATH LIKE THE PLAGUE: WOUND CARE IN THE ROMAN ARMY 
Gwendolyn E. Dougherty, Nazareth College of Rochester 
 
 
Roman Imperial dominion was predicated on aggressive, almost incessant war in far-flung places 
over several centuries. When reflecting on Rome as a warrior culture, history presents Rome’s 
wars as a simply two-sided event: the winners who triumphed and the losers who died. But there 
is another group that is often neglected, the wounded,. The victors lived to fight another day, while 
the losers either ended up dead or sold into slavery. But what happened to the wounded? How did 
the Roman army tend to its injured? Rome controlled the world through military might, but could 
the Romans control or even begin to combat the world of infection and disease, a powerful and 
unseen enemy? 
 Before the invention of antibiotics, infection was a serious consequence of improperly 
treated battle wounds. Visible enemies were not the challenge; swords, clubs, and arrows could 
provide defense. Aside from the traditional battlefield, armies faced silent enemies that could wipe 
out a third of their forces overnight. Strong, healthy men were reduced to useless skeletons of 
soldiers within hours, dead in a few days’ time if they were lucky; but most were not. Analysis of 
the ancient medical literature, such as that produced by the famed Galen of Pergamum (AD 129 – 
c. 216), indicates little knowledge of bacteria and other microbes by medical authorities. But 
scholars such as Galen understood that there were changes happening in the body because of 
wounds that had been inflicted. Having trained under the physicians Satyrus and Pelops, and 
having been exposed to numerous patients through clinical experiences and practical 
demonstration, Galen became a leading medical specialist in Rome.1 It was this expertise that 
resulted in his understanding of infection and disease, one that made distinctions between the 
healthy and the ill as a consequence of activity and inactivity. As he himself noted: 
 
For they consider the person in whom no activity of any part is impaired ‘to be 
healthy’, but someone in whom one of them is impaired ‘to be sick’. Similarly they 
call someone in whom all the bodily parts are working naturally ‘healthy’, while 
someone in whom one of them is impaired is called ‘sick’.2 
 
Despite being the leading Roman authority, Galen’s medical knowledge, like others in his 
field, was incomplete. While advanced scientific knowledge was lacking, the protocols of Roman 
physicians for treating wounds were impressive. Since warfare was an inherent part of Roman 
culture, death from injuries incurred on the field of battle was a regular experience, and always 
greeted the living with the same stomach-churning odor that would cling to every inch of their 
bodies. The ancient historians of Rome, such as Livy (59 BC – AD 17), offered vivid descriptions 
of such wounds in the infantry combat they describe: 
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Here and there amidst the slain there started up a gory figure whose wounds had 
begun to throb with the chill of dawn, and was cut down by his enemies; some were 
discovered lying there alive, with thighs and tendons slashed, baring their necks 
and throats and bidding their conquerors drain the remnant of their blood.3 
 
The smell of death was an unmistakable odor when it made its presence known. The stench 
marked the dead, the living, and the severely infected. Death was not always immediate, however. 
Those who survived, but had suffered an injury, had another even more difficult battle to win – 
the one against infection. 
Clostridium perfringens (C. perfringens), is a living death sentence. It is an invisible enemy 
more terrifying and destructive than any army the ancient world had seen. An infection by this 
bacterium marks its victims with fates worse than death itself.4 Starting with increased pain and 
swelling around the injured area – typically in the lower extremities – victims can come down with 
fever and tachycardia - rapid heart rate - as the infection begins. Within hours, the skin around the 
site turns pale, and as the battle continues, the skin progresses to dark red, then purple, then black 
in color, an indication of necrosis – the death of groups of cells in one area. The smell of death 
emanates from the area as pus drains out of the tissue, leaking from the infected site. What is 
worse, this is not a localized infection. It originates in tissue killed by an initial traumatic event – 
puncture wound, arrow, laceration, etc. Once inside, C. perfringens releases two devastating toxins 
that cause platelets to aggregate and eventually kill neighboring cells, allowing the bacterium to 
continue to spread.5 
With a reproduction rate of approximately twelve minutes, C. perfringens rapidly colonizes 
wounds, and the host’s body is taken over unbeknownst to the injured. As the infection spreads 
and more tissue is killed, quite often one option remains – surgical removal of the dead tissue. If 
left on the body, the results could range from shock, to kidney failure, to death.6 The most common 
surgery option for this type of infection is amputation.  
 
Later such tissue may become liquefied and slough. The margin between healthy 
and necrotic tissue often advances several inches per hour despite appropriate 
antibiotic therapy, and radical amputation remains the single best life-saving 
treatment. Shock and organ failure frequently accompany gas gangrene and when 
patients become bacteremic, the mortality exceeds 50%.7 
 
If victims survive the infection and resulting surgery, they are left to live with scarred and 
dismembered bodies and the possibility that not all of the infection was removed, causing lifelong 
agony and fear. 
Known today as gas gangrene, or simply gangrene, this highly virulent bacterium has 
caused many nightmares for healthcare workers and patients. While ancient Romans did not know 
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that bacteria caused this lethal disease, it was prevalent then as well. As Aulus Cornelius Celsus 
(c. 25 BC – AD 50) notes: 
 
[S]ometimes there arises what the Greeks call gangrene. The former varieties occur 
in any part of the body; gangrene in the extremities, that is in the nails, armpits or 
groins, and generally in aged people or in those of a bad habit of body. The flesh in 
the wound becomes either black or livid, but dry and shriveled; the skin near it is 
for the most part occupied by dusky pustules; then the skin around these becomes 
either pallid or livid, and usually wrinkled, deficient in sensation: farther away from 
the wound the skin is inflamed…Now…an acute fever arises and great thirst…the 
stomach begins to be affected: even the breath gets a foul odor. This disorder at its 
commencement admits of treatment; but when thoroughly established it is 
incurable, and most patients die in cold sweat.8 
 
Thanks to advances in immunology – the study of how the body protects itself – and 
microbiology – the study of microbes – death sentences handed out by microbes such as C. 
perfringens are no longer guaranteed. While severe cases of gangrene still result in amputations, 
cases caught early can be treated with an antitoxin, large doses of intravenous penicillin and 
clindamycin. In certain conditions, oxygen that is applied to the infection site under high pressure 
may be effective as well.9 Advances in medicine and medical technologies have aided patients 
across the ages – increasing survival rates, decreasing pain levels and increasing overall wellbeing.  
 While not as advanced as modern treatments, Roman doctors and physicians had their own 
techniques to combat infections. A common ancient practice by doctors was to use natural 
products, such as honey, olive oil and vinegar.10 Efficiency is key to a successful army, and Rome’s 
army was prepared to deal with almost any situation in battle. This preparedness extended all the 
way to treating their injuries as, “the Roman soldiers seem to have been equipped for emergencies 
with bandages…”11 These bandages were made of plant products and woven materials such as 
wool, cotton and flax.12 
 Not every wound treatment was as simple as wrapping it with a bandage. Often wounds 
required treatment from field doctors, known as medici, who cared for sick and wounded soldiers, 
“in well-designed and carefully built hospitals which provided insulation, quietness, and reduced 
likelihood of infection.”13 During the latter part of the Empire, around the time of Emperor Trajan 
(c. AD 53–117), field hospitals – valetudinaria – were constructed to accommodate approximately 
200 men.14 The type of injury dictated a medici’s course of action. Fractures were set with splints 
and any laceration was treated and covered with, “a variety of salves diluted in wine and made 
from a combination of salts (copper acetate, copper oxide, lead oxide), vinegar, nuts, flowers, 
grease, and fragrance (myrrh or frankincense – both bactericidal as well as fragrant).”15 With the 
number of deaths that Rome suffered from being almost constantly at war, the Romans could not 
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afford to lose many men to wounds and injuries. For this reason, when a man was found fit to fight 
again, he was sent back to the legions as soon as possible. 
 
Once soldiers have been discharged for medical reasons, it is not usual to grant 
reinstatement on the grounds that they have recovered good health, since soldiers 
are not lightly discharged and only after doctors have declared that they have 
contracted an infirmity and this has been rigorously investigated by a suitable 
judge.16 
 
With the cost of wars already extravagant, finding ways to reduce costs in training and equipping 
the legions was a priority. The more veterans who survived and the fewer new recruits the army 
had to train provided one method of cost reduction; now less money was spent on training and 
could be spent elsewhere. 
As a medical practitioner, Galen himself used materials such as nut-juice and honey as well 
to make his remedies.17 Prior to his work as the personal doctor of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (AD 
121 – 180), Galen polished and fine-tuned his practices as the head doctor of the gladiators in 
Pergamum.18 It was here that he practiced new treatments, such as the one for wounded tendons, 
and he altered techniques of previous doctors for such wounds:19 
 
Earlier in his career, Galen had completed his studies and had been appointed 
physician to the gladiators in his hometown of Pergamum, now in modern Turkey. 
This afforded him excellent opportunities to observe a variety of anatomical 
conditions, wounds and other injuries of all kinds, and to record his findings.20 
 
Galen’s time working with the gladiators provided him with medical knowledge that 
continued to be used by his colleagues for centuries. Galen was the first to understand that optimal 
healing conditions included keeping the wound moist: “in his view keeping the wound moist was 
of great importance. He soaked linen cloths in wine and placed the folds on the wounds, covering 
the cloth in soft sponges which he moistened day and night.”21 The combination of moisture and 
acidity depleted the growing conditions of bacteria enough to interrupt any growth. 
Just as soldiers lost in battle were not easily replaced, lanistas (trainers of gladiators) and 
editores (sponsors of gladiator games) could not afford to lose gladiators in the arena. “When a 
gladiator died or became disabled for a long time, the editor had to pay much more than the cost 
of his participation in a combat.”22 For this reason, any injured gladiator was given the best medical 
treatment possible. It is possibly for this reason that Galen developed certain medical philosophies, 
such as his “Therapeutic Method.” 
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So, taking as a starting-point, something agreed by all, this will be the business of 
the therapeutic model: to bring about health in bodies that are diseased; that is, to 
restore the natural activities of the parts wherever they happen to be impaired.23 
 
The ideas and philosophies developed by Galen reshaped how the Romans tended to 
their wounded. However, this is not to say before Galen soldiers did not address their wounds 
at all, though therapeutic treatment of wounds may not have been as prevalent prior to Galen. 
Commanders such as Julius Caesar (100 BC – 44 BC), saw the value in wound treatment. Not 
losing men in battle meant that he could focus his time elsewhere and not on dwindling 
manpower or having constantly to recruit and train new men; they could focus on conquering 
the world: 
 
Under stress of this emergency Caesar had, by soliciting private individuals with 
touching appeals, amassed a certain amount of corn in his garrisons, and this he 
was using sparingly. Meanwhile every day he went round the field-works in person, 
and doubled the number of cohorts on guard duty in view of the large numbers of 
the enemy. Labienus gave orders that his wounded, who were very numerous, 
should have their wounds dressed and then be carried in carts to Hadrumetum.24 
 
When compared to modern medical technology, the medical remedies and treatments used 
by Galen and Caesar seem archaic at best. The use of plants and nature-made materials to aid the 
healing process evokes exotic images of medicine men and primitive understandings of medicine. 
There is, however, empirical evidence supporting the techniques and materials used by the Romans 
for medical treatment. Many of the products had naturally occurring bactericidal properties – the 
ability to stop bacterial growth.25 These types of treatments are known today as topical antiseptics. 
When dealing with infections such as C. perfringens, which causes inadequate blood supply to 
infected areas, these types of antiseptics are highly effective as they are applied directly to the site 
of infection and have little distance to travel before encountering the pathogen.26 
 Vinegar, known scientifically as acetic acid, has cleansing properties that make  it a suitable 
antiseptic. Commonly used in “wound bed preparation,” the application of vinegar aids in the 
elimination of dead tissue and bacteria living in the wound: 
 
Wound bed preparation refers to the clearance of necrotic and/or sloughy materials 
from the bed of the wound to produce granulation tissue. In the case of infected or 
necrotic tissue, the wound must be prepared either by using surgical debridement 
or by a progressive local treatment that eliminates dead tissue.27 
 
When applied to open wounds, the acetic acid enters the bloodstream and lowers the pH in the 
infected area, ultimately producing an acidic environment around the injection/infected area.28 As 
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environments change and become more acidic, the bacteria growing in these areas react negatively; 
their growth rate decreases as an environment continues to become more acidic.29 A similar effect 
happens when wine is used as an antiseptic agent,. Wine creates a more acidic environment for the 
bacteria to live in, killing more bacteria as the environment continues to increase in acidity . 
 Olive oil was also used in treatment of lesions; it was applied to bandages and wrapped 
around wounds, keeping the environment moist. Like the mechanism of vinegar and wine, olive 
oil effects the environment as well, however, it targets the pathogen’s internal environment instead 
of the surrounding. The essential oils of olive oil are believed to increase the permeability of 
bacterial membranes. 30  This increased permeability results in the leakage of fluid from the 
bacterium; which can lead to lysis – breakdown and destruction of the cell if not stopped. The 
essential oils also inhibit microbial respiration, the process by which individual cells breathe; a 
vital process for cell growth. Although C. perfringens is an anaerobic bacterium, it too carries out 
respiration, using instead sulfur, nitrogen or carbon compounds, instead of oxygen, to breathe.31 
 Olive oil use, specifically extra virgin olive oil, produces an anti-inflammatory effect, “due 
to the inhibition of the cyclooxygenase enzyme release which is involved in prostaglandins 
synthesis.”32 Both cyclooxygenases and prostaglandins —  active fat compounds –  are important 
pro-inflammatory mediators. When a pathogen enters the body, in this case C. perfringens, an 
immune response is triggered. On the surface of these pathogens are receptors known as PAMPs 
– pathogen-associated molecular patterns. These patterns are recognized by receptors on the 
surfaces of immune cells known as PRRs – pattern recognition receptors. The binding of these two 
receptors can set off responses ranging from phagocytosis - a process by which specific cells 
destroy and eat invading cells -  to an inflammatory response.33 
Another key response is the formation of cyclooxygenase 2 (COX2) - an enzyme formed 
in the body. Induced by PRR activation in different immune cells, COX2 is vital for converting a 
fatty acid, known as arachidonic acid, into prostaglandins.34 Inflammation seems to be the ideal 
response to an infection such as C. perfringens; immune cells are alerted to the infected area and 
make their way over to fight off any antigens and pathogens. However the inflammatory response, 
is a catch-22. If done properly, the infection  is fought off and the body will return to its normal 
state. However, as with any complex process, there is always the possibility that something could 
go wrong. 
 
Resolution of this acute inflammatory response includes the clearance of invading 
pathogens, dead cells, and damaged tissue; the activation of the systemic acute 
phase response and additional physiological responses, including the initiation of 
wound healing; and the induction of adaptive immune responses. However, if the 
infection or tissue damage is not resolved, it can lead to a chronic inflammatory 
state that can cause more local tissue damage and potentially have systemic 
consequences for the affected individual.35 
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This is the major problem when dealing with an infection such as C. perfringens. Due to its 
rapid reproduction rate, this bacterium is growing at a much more rapid rate than the body can 
handle.  When the inflammatory response occurs, there is no way for the body’s immune 
system to catch up to the growth rate of C. perfringens. This induces chronic inflammation 
immediately, which is one of the reasons increased swelling and pain are the first signs of a C. 
perfringens infection. 
 Olive oil disrupts the inflammation process. While PAMPs and PRRs still connect with 
each other, indicating an antigen has entered the body, olive oil acts to stop PRRs from 
inducing the synthesis of cyclooxygenase. This ultimately prohibits arachidonic acid from 
converting into prostaglandins and therefore stopping an inflammatory response. By disrupting 
this process, olive oil, and its essential oils, act as efficient anti-inflammatory agents. 
 Another anti-inflammatory agent the Romans used was honey. First used by the Egyptians 
around 1400 BC, honey has been used for centuries in medical practices:36 
 
Honey has been used for its healing properties for centuries and has been used to 
dress wounds with promising results. Honey dressings increase healing, minimize 
debridement, prompt successful graft, remove dry crust, prevent dry scab formation 
on burns, cleanse wounds, ease separation of sloughs, deodorize wounds, cause 
soothing of wounds, and minimize scar formation.37 
 
Numerous studies have analyzed the antimicrobial and anti-inflammatory effects of the use 
of honey to treat wounds. When honey is applied to a wound, research has found that this 
stimulates the release of cytokines – small proteins important in cell signaling – which aid in 
regulating the  the intensity and duration of an immune response, depending on which cytokine 
was released.38 This response is highly regulated as excessive cytokines can cause an amplified 
inflammation response and characteristics similar to septic shock. 39  Honey is also full of 
endotoxins - toxins found on the walls of cells that releases when the cell disintegrates. These 
endotoxins activate macrophages - specific immune cells that perform phagocytosis - in order to 
produce pro-inflammatory cytokines.40 Interestingly, honey has also been found to have anti-
inflammatory properties. The exact mechanism for this property is unknown, however it is 
believed that similar to olive oil, honey inhibits prostaglandin synthesis.41 
 Researchers have found several mechanisms of actions used during the healing process by 
honey. 42  It is remarkable that honey has two pathways that counteract each other; anti-
inflammatory and pro-inflammatory. It is believed that the situation with which the honey is being 
used determines which of those two pathways it uses – if levels of inflammatory mediator are high 
or low.43 For an infection such as C. perfringens, both pathways could be utilized. When honey is 
applied at the beginning of the infection, it could recognize that there are too many inflammatory 
mediators, causing the swelling and pain, which would cause the honey to act as an anti-
inflammatory mediator. However, if the honey were applied later there may be fewer inflammatory 
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mediators in use, allowing the honey to produce more of a pro-inflammatory response. By having 
both pro- and anti-inflammatory properties, honey increases its medicinal uses making it a highly 
effective antiseptic. 
 The Roman legions comprised one of the most powerful and well-trained armies in the 
ancient world. They were a model of discipline and, for the most part, respected their commanders. 
Constantly being at war created serious problems for the soldiers. . The Roman army lost many 
men due to death on the battlefield, and some from their injuries after. It was too costly and time 
consuming to lose so many men; having to take the time to find new recruits, and then having to 
train them took away from the veterans’ continued training. To take care of the men, soldiers were 
equipped with bandages and field hospitals were set up to care for the more critically injured.44 
 There is much  to learn from how the Romans took care of their wounded. The ultimate 
goal was to get soldiers healthy enough to get them back on the battlefield.45 There was no 
complex, cure-all solution that was passed around to heal the men. Everyday products that were 
abundant in the Roman Empire were the key. While they may not have understood the exact 
science as to why these products worked, the Romans knew that they did help and could make 
people better and heal their wounds. Simplicity was the solution. 
From the modern perspective we think of the world of Galen as superstitious and simple-
minded. However, he and others alike wanted to heal people with remedies that worked: 
 
For all of Galen’s many faces…we should not forget that he regarded himself 
primarily as an iatros, a healer of patients and a restorer and preserver of health. 
Indeed, the principal job (ergon) or aim (skopos) of the medical art, he repeatedly 
says, is the treatment of disease and preservation of health; and it is his primary 
responsibility as a doctor to carry out that job in an indefinite number of particular 
cases.46 
 
 There is more than one reason why  the Roman army was the most powerful army in the 
ancient world. Discipline and rigorous training formed it into an unmatched killing machine. 
Wound care that used natural products to help the soldiers regain their health and strength was a 
powerful contribution that aided the success of the army for centuries. At first glance, the actions 
of the Roman army and doctors seem exotic and unscientific. Covering wounds with wine, olive 
oil, vinegar and honey could be construed as having come from the imagination of a child. How 
can covering wounds with food products and beverages have any sort of medicinal properties? 
Yet, when one analyzes the modern scientific literature cited, we find that there was legitimacy to 
the remedies and techniques used to treat the wounds of Roman soldiers. 
Although wound treatment was known before him, Galen set a precedent for medical 
procedures that, at the time, were considered superior and extremely advanced. For centuries many 
of his findings and practices were used throughout the ancient world until the advancement of 
science further developed his techniques and theories.47  It is clear that the natural remedies applied 
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by Galen are not able to combat every disease and infection; however, there are many microbes 
they can defeat. Rome’s army was able to take simple, everyday products such as wine, honey, 
vinegar and olive oil and use them to great advantage in their conquests, for both sustenance and 
wound treatment.  The use of such simple products of nature maintained a military at which the 
modern world still marvels. 
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AN EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE CIVIL WAR 
THROUGH THE LENS OF PHOTOGRAPHY 
Michael Lane, The College at Brockport, SUNY 
 
 
During the American Civil War, battlefield photography helped shape the Northern consciousness 
by shaking it free from preconceived ideas of martial glory and valor. This paradigm shift allowed 
the North to approach war with a modern mentality, mirroring the modernity of military tactics 
and hardware, which arose out of tactical necessity. The North was the main progenitor of 
photographic material during the war, and therefore shaped not only the contemporary 
interpretation of the war but the historical narrative as well. The Union’s archive is substantial, but 
it consists of a bias that tends to focus on the Eastern Theater along the Atlantic coast and the 
Appalachian mountains. This bias shapes the historical framework in which historians view the 
war.  
Due to the Northern naval blockade the South, on the other hand, was unable to obtain the 
chemicals and materials to produce photographs in any meaningful volume. They were able to 
capture and produce a few images in the beginning of the war but lacked the infrastructure to 
disseminate the images on a wide scale to the public. This limited access to material and markets 
hurt the South’s ability to shape public opinion. Furthermore, much of the Southern photographic 
record has been lost due to the destructive capacity of the war and the ravages of time. The disparity 
between North and South resulted in an advantage for Union supporters with regards to 
photographic propaganda, enabling the North to maintain public support even when morale ebbed 
during 1862 and 1863. Photography also allowed the North to shift its war aims to meet the 
contingencies that resulted from the volatility of the conflict.  
 Through an examination of pre-Civil War expression, found in both photography and 
traditional artistic mediums, a clear change can be delineated that will illuminate both the role that 
photography played in conveying the Union’s message and how this message changed and adapted 
over time. Additionally, an examination of the technological aspects of photography will elucidate 
the advantages the Union held over their Confederate counterparts as well as how this technology 
spurred a sense of unity throughout the North. Examining individual photographers and their 
artistic expression will further lend credence to the concept that photography morphed during the 
war, supplying the cultural material that was both overtly and covertly utilized to alter public 
opinion and enabled the North to fight the total war necessary for victory.  
 
Nineteenth-Century Landscape Painting and Its Effects on Photography 
American photographers during this period derived their artistic perspective from their 
counterparts in the art world. European and American landscape painters differed in their approach 
toward nature and the wilderness, which reflected their divergent experiences and relations with 
this realm. The former perceived danger and evil lurking in the ever-decreasing forested regions 
that harkened back to their medieval heritage. The latter saw a space for the rebirth of humanity, a 
second Eden that had been squandered in the Old World. Art historian Eleanor Harvey states, “As 
Americans began to see positive resonance in their own natural landscapes, they developed a 
wilderness aesthetic that linked America’s prospects for her future with two things: the potential 
for progress in cultivating the raw landscape and the virtues found in pristine aspects of those wild 
aspects.”1  This aestheticism lingers in photographs captured during the war and only changes to 
compensate for the level of destruction after the battle of Antietam (1862) but is never completely 
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abandoned. Often, the photographic scenes of destruction wrought upon nature and man 
reverberated with an echo of this “new” Eden being lost or destroyed.  
Harvey states that, “Balancing the awe-inspiring power of nature was a renewed awareness 
of nature’s amoral state – its indifference to human suffering as a signal of god’s displeasure – 
which insinuated itself into the vocabulary of landscape.”2 This metaphorical analogy can be seen 
throughout the photographic record of the Civil War in the landscapes, which often were scarred 
and seemed to consume the individual through the interplay of scope and perspective. Pre-
Antietam photographs regularly depict the devastation of nature in the distance while the presence 
of man is posed in the fore as an ancillary element disconnected from the grand scale of death and 
maiming that had recently occurred.  This was the result of the legacy of nineteenth-century 
respectability combined with the “aesthetically pleasing” art that preceded the war.  
In the years leading up to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, photography struggled to 
gain recognition as a valid form of artistic expression. Many of the photographers of the era, one 
of the most famous being Mathew Brady, had professional training in traditional artistic mediums 
such as painting or sketch work, social connections to artists, or a personal interest in art. To 
produce photographs that were aesthetically pleasing and commercially successful, photographers 
imitated their brethren in the traditional arts.  
At the time, the two most popular forms of paintings, and by extension photography, were 
portraiture and landscapes.  Portrait painters were able to conceal unflattering aspects of 
individuals through the use of artistic license and the use of favorable lighting. Despite the realism 
of photography, photographers were able to manipulate the lighting, the positioning of the subject, 
and the development process in order to generate works that “painted” their subjects in a flattering 
way. An example of this is Mathew Brady’s adoption of skylights, which he cut into the roof of 
his studio at 205 Broadway in Manhattan, increasing the natural light and resulting in the 
production of exceptional photographs.3  This innovation enabled him to capture and manipulate 
the contrasts between light and dark and impress his clients, who tended to be political leaders and 
celebrities, with his final product.4  Historian George Sullivan states that, “Brady’s skillfully 
lighted portraits, simple and straightforward, usually displayed a heroic quality.”5  These 
techniques and thematic compositions would translate into his work during the war. Brady’s work, 
which was modeled after the painters of his era, had a reputation for excellence, respectability, and 
artistic expression that gave him an advantage over his competitors at the start of the war. 
 
Technical Aspects of Photography  
One must first examine the technical difficulties faced by photographers in the field in 
order to understand how and why photographs were managed and staged, and how they 
represented the individual characteristics of the photographer in the same way that paintings and 
sketches did. Historian Alan Trachtenberg states, “Large cameras on tripods, lenses designed for 
landscape views, with the necessity of preparing the glass plate in a portable darkroom, then 
rushing with it to the camera-all these physical barriers to spontaneous pictures of action 
encouraged a resort to easily applied conventions of historical painting, casual sketches, and even 
studio portraits.”6 The process of capturing a photograph involved an eight step procedure which 
was nearly universal, despite the different cameras utilized. The Wet-collodion process, the most 
popular mode of production during this period, consisted of: 
1. A clean sheet of glass was evenly coated with collodion.  
2. In a darkroom or a light-tight chamber, the coated plate was immersed 
in a silver nitrate solution, sensitizing it to light.  
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3. After it was sensitized, the wet negative was placed in a light-tight 
holder and inserted into the camera, which already had been positioned 
and focused.  
4. The "dark slide," which protected the negative from light, and the lens 
cap were removed for several seconds, allowing light to expose the 
plate.  
5. The "dark slide" was inserted back into the plate holder, which was then 
removed from the camera.  
6. In the darkroom, the glass plate negative was removed from the plate 
holder and developed, washed in water, and fixed so that the image 
would not fade, then washed again and dried.  
7. Usually the negatives were coated with a varnish to protect the surface. 
8. After development, the photographs were printed on paper and 
mounted.7 
Photographers carried out this procedure in the least ideal situations, on dusty fields, 
surrounded by flies and other insects congregating to feed on the corpses of men and animal alike 
all of which could despoil the photograph. Then the photographer would have to rush into their 
“studios,” which were actually wagons with blackout cloth stretched over the frame. Temperatures 
inside these Brady wagons8 could be boiling in the summer or freezing in the winter and were full 
of noxious fumes generated by the chemical reactions.9 In order to accomplish this in the field, a 
team of two men would be employed. The complexity of the process limited the abilities of the 
photographer to produce large volumes and had the effect of accentuating their desire to make 
deliberately meaningful artistic representations that at times, and in the proper artists’ hands, would 
challenge their audience’s preconceived notions of war. Also, any pretentions of spontaneity, 
which the pictures often suggest, was lost within the reality of the complexity of the procedures. 
This resulted in a methodical approach of staging photographs with deliberate intent to affect the 
audience’s interpretation of the captured scene.  
The technological advancements in the production and dissemination of photographs 
during the war amplified the change in the public’s conceptions, a change that was essential to 
conducting a total war. Photographs produced with glass negatives and paper were cheaper than 
their predecessor, the daguerreotype. This new format could be sold cheaply and reach a greater 
audience in a quicker manner than previous modes of production. Furthermore, utilizing a glass 
negative facilitated the production of an unlimited number of pictures from a single negative. For 
these reasons, “The Civil War has been described as the first ‘living room war’ one brought home 
to viewers in the form of mass produced cartes-de-visite and stereographs.”10  These formats 
represented cutting edge technology in the 1860s and only further enhanced their desirability.  The 
increased demand for this new technology, partnered with the realism of war, shocked viewers and 
aided in the shift from the traditional conceptualization of war as heroic to new perspective of war 
as the hell it was.   Both cartes-de-visite and stereographs offered a rare glimpse of the war which 
most Northern audiences were far removed from and acted as a bonding agent that maintained 
social cohesion while simultaneously producing a catalyst for the acceptance of changes in war 
aims.    
One of the most popular forms of photographs, stereographs, were based on the principle 
of binocular vision, which creates a sense of space and distance, an early form of 3-D.11 “Made 
with a twin-lens camera, stereograph images are viewed in a lenticular device that allows virtual 
images to completely fill the viewer’s perceptual field.”12 The twin lens cameras produced two 
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negatives, which were slightly offset from one another, producing a sense of suspended reality. 
Often, these negatives have been separated from their original mate over time, leading to the loss 
of their visual impact.   Stereographs changed the way that practitioners of the art of photography 
“viewed the world both graphically and spatially.”13 Photographers considered the 3-D effect when 
choosing their subject matter and reference points. Staging photographic scenes so that the value 
of depth could be further enhanced resulted in the war coming alive for spectators in the safety of 
their private sphere far removed from the front line. 
Due to its size, which lent itself for greater mobility on the battlefield, and ability to produce 
a more visually appealing product, the twin-lens cameras was used to photograph all the dead at 
Antietam and the majority of those at Gettysburg.14  Trachtenberg contends that to understand the 
photographic popular culture that arose during the Civil War the art of producing stereographs 
must be entered into the equation; “Indeed so popular was this mode of dissemination that any 
discussion of the Civil War photographs and the problems of reading they pose must take the 
stereograph into account.”15 The fact that many of the photographs of the war dead were captured 
in this medium reveals the intent of the photographers as well as the desired impact they wanted 
to impart to their audience.  
Another photographic form, the carte-de-visite, became popular in 1860-61 and quickly 
outstripped the popularity of all other forms of photography, creating a fad that swept the nation.16  
Carte-de-visites were easy to mass-produce and trade among the civilian population, and 
measuring 21/8 x 31/2 inches, they fit neatly into albums that could be found in nearly every home 
that could afford them.17 Historian Keith Davis states, “The carte-de-visite further democratized 
the production and consumptions of portraits” and “spurred a vastly increased social circulation of 
photographs.”18 No longer were political and military leaders, battlefields or the death and 
destruction of the war abstractions muted by artistic renditions found in papers; they became real 
and entered the psyche of the individual and the public consciousness on an unprecedented level. 
These photographs became a form of cultural economy that was easily shared, spreading the 
realities of the war as well as the justification for the ever-greater sacrifices that would be needed 
to win a modern war of attrition. This shaped the consciousness of the civilian population, and as 
result of the photographs being produced by Union supporters with the explicit permission of the 
army, the message was controlled and uniform.   
 
The Men behind the Photographs 
Mathew Brady is arguably the most well-known Civil War photographer because of his 
foresight to finance and enlist photographers to travel with the army. However, many of the 
photographs attributed to him were from photographers’ works that he purchased or by those he 
employed. Furthermore, he disliked going to battlefields because of their remote locations and 
limited amenities. As discussed earlier, Brady was renowned for both his ability to produce quality 
photographs as well as the social status of his clientele. When war broke he utilized his connections 
to gain access to the military and battlefields. Brady desired to be the “nation’s historian” and with 
the breakout of hostilities “believed he would be contributing toward building a record of the war’s 
events”19  
Brady’s exalted social status and penchant for aesthetically pleasing photographs resulted 
in an initial continuation of traditional artistic expression. American painters had “developed an 
American wilderness aesthetic, in which the landscape itself carried morally instructive 
overtones,” and Brady continued within this heritage.20 This formula, which had suited him before 
the war, hid the destructive nature of modern warfare and made it more palatable for him and his 
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audience’s sense of respectability. Art historian Eleanor Harvey argues that “Beginning with 
[Brady’s] pastoral and meditative photographs of the landscape at Bull Run taken 1862, Brady 
favored the metaphorical approach to the ravages of war, in keeping with the prevailing aesthetics 
of painting.”21 However, Brady was a shrewd, if in the end unsuccessful, business man, and when 
opportunities arose to purchase or display photographs that attracted audiences and customers to 
his galleries he was not averse to the ideal. However, Brady conformed to the traditional artistic 
values in which he was bred and did not deliberately challenge the conceptions of military heroism. 
He was in many regards an elitist whose art reflected his position by minimizing the human and 
destructive elements of warfare. In the end Brady was not the man who was going to break with 
convention and alter the public’s concepts of war.  
 Brady’s photograph of Pontoon Bridge at Bull Run, Va.22 in 1862 follows the traditional 
landscape narrative; everything seems tranquil, bucolic even, and the casual observer might 
overlook the destruction on the hillside. The soldiers in the foreground are diminutive in scale 
when compared to the landscape in the background, a technique often employed by landscape 
painters. During peace time, these soldiers could fill in for a genial social gathering at a picnic 
after church services. The men’s uniforms and the destruction of the landscape are the only 
indication that a battle had been fought at the site. However, even the loss of natural vitality in the 
photograph could be misconstrued and attributed to the taming of the wilderness via timber 
harvesting, another trope of prewar painting aesthetics. Perspective blurs the uniforms, making it 
difficult for the audience to grasp the nature and relationship of the human element. One would be 
hard pressed to distinguish any of the upheaval associated with war, so challenging of the 
preconceived public concepts of war through his photographic composition would be almost 
unfathomable.  
Another, example of landscape aestheticism can be located in Brady’s rendition of where 
General John F. Reynolds Was Killed at Gettysburg, 1863.23  Lost again is the impact of modern 
warfare upon nature and man alike; without the caption it would be nearly impossible to delineate 
that one of the greatest struggles of the war had occurred on this spot. This photo could easily find 
its way into a carte-de-visite album in any respectable parlor due to its aesthetic beauty and 
picturesque landscape. A conclusion could easily be reached that the three fallen trees in the 
background collapsed due to a strong storm or other natural event, not as a result of the carnage of 
a struggle to the death between opposing armies. The men appear to be surveying the landscape as 
if they were planning where to plant crops. There is no indication that a general or for that manner 
anyone had died on the spot. The vista is awe-inspiring, but with regards to chronicling the 
historical record of the event, Brady misses the mark. In order to facilitate a paradigm shift of 
public consciousness other photographers would have to fill the void left by Brady’s lack of vision.  
Two photographers in the employment of Brady, and who would forever leave their imprint 
upon photo journalism, were Alexander Gardner and Timothy H. O’Sullivan. Due to their 
proximity to the death and destruction wrought by modern warfare, they both actually went to the 
scenes of battle immediately after the conclusion of hostilities, and they altered their artistic 
interpretations of battlefields and the resulting detritus. For example, in the aftermath of the Battle 
of Antietam (September 17. 1862), Gardner and O’Sullivan arrived together at the battlefield 
within two days of the Confederate Army’s retreat. This allowed the men to capture photographs 
that capitalized on the realism of photography, resulting in a depiction of the carnage of the deadly 
struggle that still resonates with a modern audience as it did with their contemporaries.  
The burial parties did not have the opportunity to intern the soldiers, which had sanitized 
the scene of previous other battlefields. Strewn across the landscape were the disfigured and 
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bloating bodies of young men from both the North and South. The pictures these men captured 
broke from the tradition of presenting war as respectable with heroic pageantry. Instead, the 
photographers decided to portray the realities of war, including men and horses in various degrees 
of decay and military supplies smashed, upturned and abandoned. There are some convincing 
arguments that some scenes were altered by the photographers, but their photographs at Antietam24 
(1862) and later Gettysburg25 (1863) resulted in a landmark moment for photography and 
photojournalism that forever altered the way war was presented to the public. Gardner and 
O’Sullivan transfixed a historical moment into a visual expression that revealed the horrors of war 
to all that viewed the macabre scenes. Only the most self-delusional individual could claim that 
war was heroic and glorious once they had viewed these photographs.   
Within in a month of the battle these photographs were placed on display at Brady’s gallery 
in Manhattan, giving the public their first view of dead soldiers. The photographs measured 3 x 3 
¾ inches and were viewed through the use of a magnifying glass.26 The astonishment of the 
spectators was palpable. The New York Times review of the exhibition stated, “They were shocking 
and terrible, yet at the same time they were mesmerizing and captivating.”27 The clarity of the 
scenes combined with the magnifying glasses brought the war to the individual spectators resulting 
in an up-close and personal experience. One can only imagine a mother, wife, or sister viewing 
the scenes and discerning their loved one’s last moments, frozen in rigor mortis and captured for 
posterity. Many of these photographs were produced for public consumption as well and sold as 
stereographs, increasing the scope and effect of the gruesome vignette on the public’s 
consciousness.   
When viewing Garner’s and O’ Sullivan’s photographs of Antietam it becomes crystal 
clear where their departure from Brady’s aesthetically pleasing formula occurs.  Gone are the 
sweeping vistas with merely hints of destruction. For example, in Alexander Gardner’s photograph 
of dead confederate soldiers in “Bloody Lane” at Antietam, the corpses are stacked upon each 
other like cord wood.28 Upon closer inspection via a magnifying glass, the individual bodies of the 
dead become untangled and visible. The New York Times review continued “Of all objects of 
horror one would think the battle-field should stand preeminent, that it should bear away the palm 
of repulsiveness. But, on the contrary, there is a terrible fascination about it that draws one near 
these pictures, and makes him loth [sic] to leave them. You will see hushed, reverend groups 
standing around these weird copies of carnage, bending down to look in the pale faces of the dead, 
chained by the strange spell that dwells in dead men’s eyes.”29 The mutilated corpses left nothing 
to the imagination; it was both repulsive and enthralling, forever altering the audience’s 
perspective.  The ability to view photographed scenes of death was a novelty that enticed the 
voyeuristic nature of the men and women who lined up and paid to see these photographic scenes. 
These spectators were transported directly to the battlefield and any vestige of the conceptions of 
the concocted fallacy of military valor was challenged, if not expunged completely from their mind 
set.  
After leaving the employ of Brady, and only ten months after Antietam, Gardner and 
O’Sullivan displayed their photographs of Gettysburg at Gardner’s Washington gallery.  These 
photographs focus even closer on the individualistic nature of war and have become the iconic 
visual images that many modern observers recall when reimagining the Civil War. Timothy H. 
Sullivan’s Field Where General Reynolds Fell, Gettysburg stands in stark contrast to Brady’s 
rendition of the same scene.30 The most obvious departure can be gleaned from the lack of bodies 
in Brady’s compilation. The discrepancy alludes to the fact that Brady was not on scene 
immediately following the battle. Furthermore, the artistic expression that Brady exhibits is 
#History, Volume 2 
19 
manifested in the power of nature and the landscape, similar to that of a painter or sketch artist. 
O’Sullivan’s rendition focuses on the deadly struggle and its aftermath. The bloated bodies, the 
blood stained shirts, and the limbs frozen in time reflect the loss of life, which only moments before 
was vibrant. The stylistic difference of the opposing artists transcends time, and the effects on the 
viewing public were probably dialectically opposed. Brady’s images would make a young man 
giddy at the prospect of war while O’Sullivan’s image would shake the confidence of the bravest 
soul.  
Gardner and O’Sullivan were artists and they did not necessarily capture the reality of war 
in its purest form, as their modern detractors will so poignantly point out, but they manipulated 
their medium to convey a message or feeling or even to produce an aesthetically “appealing” (if 
this word can apply to death images) experience. In Gardner’s Dead Confederate Sharpshooter in 
the Devil’s Den, Gettysburg, Pa.,31 critics correctly argue that the sharp shooter’s rifle and the 
shooter himself were more than likely moved to this locale and staged in this position. However, 
this does not eliminate the appeal or even the relevance of the photograph. The fact that the body 
in the photograph was moved and positioned reinforces the idea that Gardner and O’Sullivan were 
artists who constructed their artistic vision within their medium to meet their audience’s 
expectations. The propping of the gun in the background would have added a layer of depth for 
the stereograph photos which only increased their appeal. The position of the face in the fore drew 
in the audience toward what would normally repulse a viewer, as well as personalized the death 
by adding a level of humanity that would remove the individual from the abstract construct 
purveyed by the statistics found in a newspaper. Modern art theorist Jonathan Crary proposes that 
nineteenth-century, “Photography [was] an element of a new and homogenous terrain of 
consumption and circulation in which an observer becomes lodged.”32 It was no longer possible 
to remove oneself from the carnage of the war, a war that was abstract and distant.  Instead, the 
war became tangible and entered the universal lexicon of shared experience. Gardner and 
O’Sullivan were more keenly aware of this reality than the public and even most of their 
contemporaries, and they capitalized on this to shape public opinion. Nothing “lodges” a spectator 
into the realities of war more so than the images of disfigured dead bodies.   
 
African American Representations in Photography, a Shift in Representation 
 Photography not only shaped public conceptions of the war, but even reshaped the 
justification for the war. Abraham Lincoln at the outset of his administration focused on preserving 
the Union because he realized that Border States and the majority of the population would not 
support a war fought over abolition of slavery. However, “On September 22, five days after the 
battle of Antietam, Lincoln called his cabinet into session,” to advise them that he would be issuing 
the Emancipation Proclamation freeing slaves in rebel held territories.33 The level of death and 
destruction up to this point in the war conflated with the unimaginable loss at Antietam created a 
need for the justification of the war to be raised to a higher plain. Much of this shift in Lincoln’s 
perspective and that of the civilian populations came about as a result of the dissemination of 
photographs depicting the carnage of Antietam, first in newspapers, then in photographic 
installations at Brady’s studio, and then in carte-de-visite and stereographs.  The Emancipation 
Proclamation, in turn, resulted in a shift in the photographic record of African Americans from 
contraband and servants to noble warriors fit to wear the uniform and willing to fight for the Union. 
In order for this transition to be accepted by the public, the message transmitted via photography 
kept pace and often went beyond the written word.   
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Typical of early photographs of African Americans or “contraband” can be seen in the 
photograph of A Black Family Crossing the Union Lines.34 The agents within the photograph look 
destitute, disheveled, and certainly devoid of any possibility of being or becoming productive 
citizens.  They appear to be driving a broken-down, arguably stolen, wagon which is overloaded 
with individuals and materials. This picture and its caption does not explain their “true” 
circumstances or whether the individuals were skilled or not, when many former slaves were as 
skilled as Northern workers in agriculture and domestic services. This family might even appear 
to be to be a threat to Northern society and countered the predominant eighteenth-century idea of 
respectability. Based on this photo, only a worker or farmer with a deep sense of altruism would 
go off and fight to free slaves depicted in this manner.  
Another theme prevalent in the early days of the war was of African Americans portrayed 
as servants, and in the case of John Henry,35 retainers of their liberators in the army. Henry’s 
position as servant to a white man, who was more than likely an officer, maintained the social and 
class hierarchy of white supremacy. The clothing he wears is torn at the shoulder and crudely 
repaired. It lacks martial vigor and seems to be of poor quality. As a result of the Emancipation 
Proclamation (January 1, 1863) these representations of African American decreased, and the 
ability to project upon African Americans a sense of honor, bequeathed to them through their duty 
to the Union, became more acceptable. This change allowed for many African Americans to serve 
the nation in the army and in many respects supported the ideas of racial equality for many. No 
longer were African America the alterity of American society, and this is reflected in the 
composition of photographs that were made available to the public.   
An example of this shift can be found in the photograph of Gordon,36 which acted as a 
rallying cry for many abolitionist and Union supporters. “Based on photographs taken in Baton 
Rouge in April 1863, the image gained notoriety originally as a carte-de-visite, before being 
published as an engraving in Harper’s Weekly in a special Fourth of July issue that same year.”37 
The ability to quickly produce and disseminate the carte-de-visite enabled the Northern cause for 
Union and abolition to rapidly spread its message; gaining support for the Emancipation 
Proclamation and garnering much needed support for the war effort, which was at its nadir. In an 
article entitled “Typical Negro”, Harper’s Weekly printed a triptych that presumed to show the 
transition of Gordon from Slave to Union soldier.38 Although there is considerable skepticism 
today regarding the authenticity of the photograph or Gordon’s rise to become a soldier, the 
photograph did act as a rallying point for the Union. The transition to a new representation of 
African Americans served the Union’s propaganda needs by expanding a visual narrative that now 
promulgated the edict of racial harmony in joint sacrifice for the cause, but it must be noted not 
necessarily racial equality. This shift in public opinion, brought about by political expediency and 
supported by photographic depictions, allowed the Union to field a larger army and depleted the 
Confederacy of laborers, which hastened the end of the war.   
The image of an African American Burial Party at Cold Harbor39 is a haunting 
juxtaposition of death and life. The African American crew is collecting the dead remains of Union 
soldiers, who arguably could have died for the Union as well as for the emancipation of blacks. 
“Unlike popular notions before the Civil War of the United States as a place where American 
culture would civilize the world through progressive advances in technology and wealth, the Burial 
Party at Cold Harbor exposed death, wildly uncontrolled and wreaking havoc on the idea that 
humans at the time had developed a more humane way to live.”40 Lost was any reverence or any 
ceremony of remembrance surrounding death, the bodies were just tossed upon the stretcher with 
no regard for the humanity that the corpses once represented. This photograph, by John Reekie, 
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takes the visual expression of death and destruction, began by Gardner and O’Sullivan at Antietam, 
to a level that would have been inconceivable regarding public sensibilities concerning martial 
valor of the war before 1861. This connotative expression of war would justify the total war 
approach taken by General Grant and Sherman in their bid to conclude a peace as rapidly as 
possible. Any opposition to destroying the South’s will to resist was buried with photographs such 
as Burial Party at Cold Harbor. 
The shift in public consciousness became more accepted after 1863, and the photographs 
of African American men in uniform, carrying weapons, and resisting oppression played a role in 
this transition. The Emancipation Proclamation and the Militia Act (1862) “empowered the 
president to enroll ‘persons of African descent’ for ‘any service for which they might be found 
competent’ including service as soldiers.”41 The picture of African American troops42 taking an 
aggressive military stance, armed with rifles, aiming presumably at white adversaries would have 
been just as radical for the North as it was for the South at the outset of hostilities. However, the 
pictures of the war’s devastation and of slaves’ horrific abuses at the hands of overseers 
conditioned the public to accept African American men as soldiers, if not on moral grounds then 
on practical. From the structure of the buildings and their condition it is not difficult to imagine 
that these soldiers found themselves in a slave quarters on a plantation. The former slave returning 
to avenge the misdeeds perpetrated upon their people. A reinforcement of and a final justification 
for the shift in war aims that would have resonated with Unionist or abolitionist alike.  
 
Conclusion 
The Civil War was a political battle fought with modern concepts of mass production and 
technological advances.  Only the subjugation of the South or the bleeding white of the North 
would have resulted in a termination of hostilities. Historian Gerald F. Linderman states that, 
“Conceptions initially embraced by society at large- national war aims, attitudes toward the enemy, 
views regarding the character of fighting-retain vitality for civilians long after the experience of 
the soldier rendered them remote or even false.”43 Photography played an integral role in changing 
the public’s conceptions of war resulting in closer assimilation of the ideas and justification that 
soldiers on the front had already determined. Without this change the war would have lasted 
longer, which might very well have jeopardized the Union’s ability to win.  General Grant’s bloody 
refusal to retreat despite great loss of life and material, and General Sherman’s “March to the Sea” 
might not have been acceptable to a population trapped in an ideology that perceived warfare as 
glorious. Without the ability of the camera to show African Americans in service to the Union, 
public opinion might not have supported the use of black soldiers. This would have deprived the 
Union of a valuable tool in weakening the Confederacy while strengthening the Union. 
Photography shaped the political and moral attitudes of Northerners during the Civil War, as its 
modern counterparts continues to do. The new technologies, which increased production and 
expanded dissemination, cannot be overlooked. The photographers who mustered their artistic and 
personal connections with the war caused a change in public opinion that was essential to 
conducting a total war. Northern society was prepared to embark on this path because of the 
realism of the destruction, which was transmitted to them via photographs that reshaped their 
consciousness.  
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THE LAST CONTINGENCY: THE FINAL CHANCE FOR SOUTHERN 
VICTORY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
Alexander Parysek, The College at Brockport 
 
 
By the year of 1864, the North and South had been at war for roughly three years. A year 
previously, the Confederacy experienced a great military defeat at Gettysburg; a battle that many 
believe represented the South’s last chance for victory and secession. However, there was still a 
chance of a negotiated independence for the Confederacy. The South’s chance lay in making the 
war too tiring and costly for the Northern public to accept. 1864 was also a presidential election 
year, and if the Confederacy had not been so spectacularly defeated on the battlefield during the 
election, there is a chance that President Abraham Lincoln would have lost his bid for reelection 
to the Democratic hopeful, George B. McClellan. Had he won, the outcome of the Civil War 
would likely have been very different. However, McClellan did not win, and Lincoln became the 
President, ensuring the North’s continued commitment to the war. This course of events in 1864 
is an example of historian James McPherson’s contingency theory, which asserts that the 
Union’s Civil War victory was not pre-determined, and instead it was contingent on the outcome 
of key event that could have went the other way and led to a Confederate victory. This paper will 
argue that the outcome of the Civil War hinged, not on the well-known numerical superiority of 
the North, but rather on the avoidable failures of Confederate leadership, which led to massive 
battlefield defeats in 1864.  
The North did have superior manpower and resources. The North had a greater 
population, larger industrial capacity, and better logistical systems than the South did. They had 
a better navy that they were able to blockade and corner the South, and the North had the better 
diplomatic game with overseas nations. Finally, the North was more united than the South; many 
areas in the South were Unionist, most notably the area of West Virginia and this has led many 
to argue that the North simply overwhelmed the Confederate forces. This explanation originated 
first from the defeated Confederate soldiers themselves. Robert E. Lee’s speech at Appomattox 
implies this with his remarks about how “The Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to 
yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.”1 Similarly, when asked about the Confederate 
defeat, a Confederate soldier replied that, “they never whipped us, Sir, unless they were four to 
one. If we had anything like a fair chance or less disparity of numbers, we should have won our 
cause and established our independence.”2 Later generations continued to point to the Union’s 
undeniably superior resources as the primary cause of their victory.  Historian Richard Current 
stated that “God was on the side of the heaviest battalions,”3 while Shelby Foote in Ken Burns’s 
Civil War documentary noted that “the North fought with one hand behinds its back: and that the 
South never had a chance at all.4  
Other historians, however, have challenged the assertion that the North’s victory was 
inevitable.  In particular, James McPherson’s posited “contingency theory,” which argues that 
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the South had many chances for victory at various points during the war.5 Historians like Gabor 
S. Boritt and Gary Ecelbarger have supported McPherson’s theory, with Ecelbarger citing the 
conflict for Atlanta as being a critical turning phase in the war. 6 Others like Reid Mitchell, 
accept the contingency theory, but also acknowledge that the Union had the odds stacked in their 
favor due to their superior resources.7 Whereas, Albert Castel explicitly rejects the idea that 
superior numbers and logistics guaranteed Northern victory.8 
Of all the potential outcomes during the war, McPherson’s argument that the events of 
1864 and Lincoln’s resulting reelection represented both the last and best chance for Confederate 
victory is the strongest. 9 By 1864 there was a peace faction movement in the North that sought 
to achieve a negotiated peace with the South. On varied fronts, the Union forces seemed stalled, 
and with no foreseeable end in sight to the war. After three years, the carnage of war had taken 
its toll on many on both sides. There was a real danger that the Northern public would grow tired 
of the war and elect another President to push forth a negotiated peace settlement. The North’s 
advantages were only relevant to the victory if they had the willpower and competence to utilize 
them properly. and if the Northern public had realized that they had effectively won by the fall of 
1864.   
 Abraham Lincoln’s reelection was uncertain. If he did not win, then the war may have 
ended in a negotiated peace settlement. Lincoln faced a popular opponent, former Union General 
George B. McClellan. McClellan was charismatic, determined and an easy candidate for the 
Democrats to rally behind. Lincoln’s potential defeat at the hands of McClellan was contingent 
on the outcome of two events on the battlfields in 1864.One was the Confederate government’s 
decision to replace General Joseph E. Johnston with General John Bell Hood in Georgia. The 
change in leadership prompted a foolish assault that decimated the Confederate forces in Georgia 
and allowed General William Tecumseh Sherman to take Atlanta and win a smashing victory for 
the Union forces. The other event that impacted the election was General Philip Sheridan’s 
campaign in the Shenandoah Valley and his defeat of the Confederate forces led by Jubal Early. 
These two great battles were key victories for the Northern war effort. They raised Northern 
morale and convinced the people that victory was very much possible.10 The war continued for 
several more months, but these two events played a pivotal role in deciding the outcome.  
However, in the years leading up to 1864 there was a possibility for the Confederates to 
gain the upper hand. In the eastern theater, the Army of the Potomac was plagued by a series of 
ineffectual or timid commanders who could not utilize their resources effectively to defeat the 
Confederacy. Lincoln was frustrated with his commanders until he was able to find the generals 
he was looking for that could achieve victory with ruthless drive. He found those generals in 
Ulysses Grant and William Sherman who quickly made his Civil War victory dreams a reality.11 
By late 1864, the South had lost the will to fight as the North pushed forward. Apart from the 
morale boost brought by these victories, they had the very real strategic and tactical effects of 
shutting down Southern supply lines and dealing immense damage to Southern infrastructure, 
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especially in the fertile granaries of the Shenandoah Valley. The South was defeated, and the 
North won the military portion of the Civil War.  
To understand why 1864 presented the last chance for a Confederate victory, one must 
look at the military and political situation of the events leading up to 1864. The North and the 
South had engaged in military warfare for three years now. The South tended to dominate in the 
Eastern part of the war while the North dominated in the Western and home fronts of the war. In 
political and military terms, the South had some chances for independence. Given the North’s 
inherent advantages in manpower and logistics, the most optimal of all those chances relied on 
the North not choosing to go to war at all. If the North had realized these advantages, then they 
could gradually grind down and crush the South.12 
Early in the war certain individuals like Winfield S. Scott realized this and drew up the 
Anaconda plan to crush the South. This plan would become the bedrock of Northern victory. By 
contrast, the South adopted a more reactive strategy, of waiting on the defensive to repel the 
Northern invaders and hold out until they gained sovereign recognition of their new state. The 
North would play the role of the attacker and the South that of the defender. It was a dynamic 
that held true save for a handful of instances such as Lee’s two invasions of the North in 1862 
and later in 1863, both with the intent of gaining European recognition of the Confederacy in 
what they hoped would be a ‘’Southern Saratoga,” In both aspects, Lee failed to achieve that sort 
of great victory, and indeed he avoided destruction narrowly.13 
The year of 1864 saw the long-awaited clash between the two leading generals of both 
sides, Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant. Each had won a series of victories for their respective 
sides and both here highly regarded by the Presidents of their nations. It proved to be a great 
clash in the East. Lee had won victories against the Union army in the East before, and Grant had 
cut his teeth in carving up Confederate territories in the Western theater. By 1864, Lincoln had 
called Grant to command the Army of the Potomac and thus set the stage for the finale of the 
war. While Lee had won bold and stunning victories against previous Union generals, his 
victories were as much his tactical skill as his opponent’s hesitation and incompetence. Most of 
his previous Union opponents were not inspiring men. That would change when he fought Grant 
who possessed both the skill and more importantly the willpower to achieve victory.  
Grant’s conduct of the war in the East was different than that of the previous generals and 
contributed to the South’s loss. Previously the armies retired after great set-piece battles to give 
the soldiers time and rest to recuperate for the next battle. Grant pursued total warfare and 
continuous attrition warfare against Lee. It had the effect of whittling down the numbers of Lee’s 
army in continuous attrition warfare. The Confederate army steadily disintegrated because it 
could not absorb the kinds of losses it was sustaining from the battles with Grant. Eventually, the 
Confederate army was forced into the bloody siege of Petersburg where the first instances of 
trench warfare appeared to observers. This siege warfare strategy allowed the Confederacy to 
hold off the Union forces for the nine months they fought there until Grant extended the lines so 
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much that Lee was forced to retreat. This series of battles concluded in Lee’s famous surrender at 
Appomattox.14 
While Grant pinned down Lee in Virginia, he had capable subordinates who won battles 
that the North needed to achieve that victory on the home front. The victories in the other 
theaters provided the needed impetus for Lincoln to win a second term.  Grant issued orders for 
General Philip Sheridan to take care of the Shenandoah Valley and end the Confederate control 
of that area. He also issued orders for General Sherman to go through Georgia and split the South 
in half. Both campaigns had great consequences. According to Grant “It was followed later by 
Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns probably had more 
effect in settling the election of the following November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, 
and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the North.”15 The two conflicts were the 
last chance for the South to achieve a negotiated peace. They were unable to avoid the outcome 
and thus could not secure their independence.16 
In Georgia, the Union advance was commanded by William T. Sherman, one of the 
generals Grant promoted and charged with defeating the Confederates in the state. He initiated a 
strategy of total war in order to destroy the Southern war industry. Opposing him was General 
Joseph E. Johnston, a skilled and cautious general who stymied Sherman’s advance into Atlanta. 
This defensive strategy worked well for the Confederacy because of technological advances in 
weaponry during the Civil War; firepower had become more lethal and advanced. Much of this 
had been proven on Civil War battlefields like Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Cold Harbor and 
other destructive direct assaults that fared poorly in the attack.17 
 In response to criticisms from Jefferson Davis, Johnston summarized the strategic 
situation in Georgia, concluding, “Therefore, a victory gained by us could not have been 
decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous.”18 The risks of a defeat outweighed 
the rewards of a victory. Rather the victory for the Confederacy in 1864 relied on simply holding 
out long enough. Johnston preserved the lives of his men and refused to give Sherman the kind 
of grand setpiece battle that would allow the Union forces to bring their logistical advantages to 
bear against him. 
Even Johnston’s opponents agreed that he was making the correct tactical decisions. 
Grant himself wrote in his memoirs, “For the most part I think Johnston was correct” explicitly 
noting that Johnston might have been able to delay Sherman’s advance by a year to the point 
where the North might have gotten tired of the conflict.19 General Sherman, Johnston’s opponent 
in that campaign, also agreed that Johnston had made the correct decisions, stating that his tactics 
were “cautious but prudent.”20 Johnston’s tactics would preserve his army and effectively stymie 
Sherman’s advance into Georgia. The one frontal assault that Sherman did execute at Kennesaw 
Mountain ended in a bloody repulse of Northern forces who suffered heavy losses.21 
Johnston’s cautious tactics eventually got him replaced. Despite his sound and prudent 
generalship, he had a terrible relationship with Confederate President Jefferson Davis.22 The two 
men did not get along very well. Davis was also notorious for interfering in the military 
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commands of his generals.23 These faults were combined with his frustration at Johnston’s 
defensive tactics. He replaced Joseph E. Johnston with a general named John Bell Hood, who 
had served with the army of Northern Virginia. John Bell Hood brought a much more direct and 
aggressive command structure to the army in Georgia that ended with its destruction. Hood 
proceeded to leave Johnston’s fortifications in Atlanta and run his army into the ground through 
a series of frontal assaults. The Army of the Tennessee simply disintegrated in a series of costly 
attacks on the prepared Union defenses. Even after Sherman moved on, General Hood continued 
to run his army into the ground by attacking Nashville and Franklin.24 
The change in command was greatly benfited Sherman in Georgia. He asked his officers, 
some of whom knew Hood from the prewar days, what kind of man he was. Sherman learned 
that Hood was a brave and reckless fighter, but not as intelligent or reserved as Johnston.25 
Sherman was faced with a different kind of opponent from Hood, an aggressive one that finally 
gave Sherman the fight he was looking for. He was able to force the Confederate army into a 
series of battles that would whittle them down due to attrition and destroy them, which allowed 
Sherman to take Atlanta and move through Georgia and into South Carolina.26 
Northern reaction to the fall of Atlanta was filled with delight. Harper’s Weekly 
celebrated the news with joy noting that ”There is not a man who did not feel that McClellan’s 
chances were diminished by the glad tidings from Atlanta; nor any one who does not know that 
if Sherman had been defeated, the friends of the Chicago candidate would have felt surer of his 
success.”27 General Sherman himself noted in his memoirs of the fortunate timing of the victory, 
stating that “This victory was most opportune; Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterward that even 
he had previously felt in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away; that General Grant 
seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg, and my army seemed to have run up 
against an impassable barrier, when, suddenly and unexpectedly, came the news that "Atlanta 
was ours, and fairly won." It was welcome news for the Union.28  
By contrast, the mood of the Confederacy to the fall of Atlanta, demonstrated the other 
side of the contingency theory. The loss was a blow to Southern morale on home front. Mary 
Bodkin Chestnut wrote with lamentation that Atlanta had fallen, and the Confederate Army faced 
misfortune, saying that “These stories of our defeats in the valley fall like blows upon a dead 
body. Since Atlanta fell I have felt as if all were dead within me forever. Captain Ogden, of 
General Chesnut's staff, dined here to-day. Had ever brigadier, with little or no brigade, so 
magnificent a staff? The reserves, as somebody said, have been secured only by robbing the 
cradle and the grave-the men too old, the boys too young. Isaac Hayne, Edward Barnwell, 
Bacon, Ogden, Richardson, Miles are the picked men of the agreeable world.”29 The citizens of 
the Confederacy lost their will to continue fighting the war.  
In his memoirs, Johnston himself recognized the vital nature of taking Atlanta noting that 
“The importance to the Confederacy of defeating the enterprise against Atlanta was not to be 
measured by military consequences alone. Political considerations were also involved, and added 
much to the interest of that campaign.”30 This provided the Confederacy with the breathing room 
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they needed on the negotiating table as Johnston further notes: “If Sherman had been foiled, 
these teachings would have caused great exaggeration of the consequences of his failure, which 
would have strengthened the peace party greatly; so much, perhaps, as to have enabled it to carry 
the presidential election, which would have brought the war to an immediate close.” 31 
Unfortunately, his opponents recognized this as well. 
Sherman was able to do this only because of Johnston’s removal and his replacement 
with John Bell Hood. Hood sent his army against the Union forces, leaving Georgia open to 
Sherman’s advances. The reason for this mistake is due to the flaws of Confederate President 
Jefferson Davis, who interfered too much and played favorites with his generals. At first glance 
Davis might appear to have the excellent qualifications for a wartime commander, since he 
served as secretary of war for Franklin Pierce. Unfortunately, his flaw of micromanaging and 
playing favorites would be his undoing.32 It was because of Davis’s choice that the defensive-
minded commander that the South needed in Georgia, was replaced Hood who was not suited for 
the task at hand. 
The North’s Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864 led to another decisive military 
victory that convinced the home front that victory was near. The campaign was ordered by 
General Grant to clear out the Shenandoah Valley of Confederate forces. It was a fertile area that 
supplied Confederate army with food and resources. In the words of General Grant “The 
Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates because it was the principal 
storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond. It was well known that they 
would make a desperate struggle to maintain it.”33 Burning and destroying the valley’s resources 
would be a prudent strategic move to weaken the Confederate armies and increase Northern 
fortunes in Virginia. 
Grant put General Philip Sheridan in charge, a daring young cavalry officer who made it 
his mission to destroy the Confederate forces in the valley. According to his own memoirs 
“General Grant had not only decided to retain in the Shenandoah Valley a large force sufficient 
to defeat [General Jubal] Early's army or drive it back to Lee, but he had furthermore determined 
to make that sections by the destruction of its supplies, untenable for continued occupancy by the 
Confederates. This cut off one of Lee's mainstays in the way of sustenance, and at the same time 
diminish the number of recruits and conscripts he received.”34 Sheridan would face Confederate 
forces under the leadership of Early, one of Lee’s officers. There would be some battles and 
clashes until Sheridan made great successes at the battles of Fisher Hill and Cedar Creek that saw 
the Confederate forces smashed in battle. Both of these battles were great propaganda victories 
for the Union. Over the course of the campaign, Sheridan followed the example of General 
Sherman and proceeded to destroy as much as he could of the farms and mills in the Shenandoah 
region to deny it as a place of operation for future Confederate forces. It was an excellent 
example of contingency, with both obtaining a political victory for Lincoln and achieving a 
strategic goal at the same time.35 
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The Shenandoah Valley campaign unquestionably affected the election of 1864. 
According to Sheridan’s memoirs “the authorities at Washington having impressed upon me that 
the defeat of my army might be followed by the overthrow of the party in power, which event, it 
was believed, would at least retard the progress of the war, if, indeed, it did not lead to the 
complete abandonment of all coercive measures.”36 Sheridan’s victory at Cedar Creek was said 
to have averted a “national disaster” due to the upcoming nature of the elections.37 General Grant 
himself noted that “I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a 
decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the November 
elections. The convention which had met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate 
for the presidency had declared the war a failure.” In this case, the North won that decisive 
victory.38 
For the election of 1864, it was between the “National Union” led by Lincoln, which was 
the Republican Party with some pro-War Democrats added to the mix. They were opposed by the 
Democratic Party, most notably the anti-war faction among the Democrats, who were derisively 
called “copperheads” by their detractors. The Democratic Party had nominated George 
McClellan. A proud and charismatic man, he had served as a successful railroad president before 
the war and was effectively the army’s golden boy in the immediate prewar years. However, he 
was too timid as a soldier. After he wasdismissed by Lincoln, McClellan would reappear as the 
Democratic candidate for victory, railing against Lincoln’s continuation of the war. As things 
stood at the latter half of 1864, he had a good chance of victory. McClellan and Lincoln had not 
gotten along in their previous years. Lincoln saw McClellan as being too cautious and 
ineffectual. McClellan had nothing but disdain for Lincoln, referring to him in derogatory terms. 
While McClellan himself was pro-war and favored the Union, the Democratic Party as a whole 
pushed forth a platform for peace. It was likely that a Northern victory with McClellan in 
command, may have led to a more generous peace settlement for the Confederacy. Due to the 
great Union military victory at Atlanta in 1864, Lincoln was able to rally the popular support that 
he needed to carry the election successfully. Lincoln won over seventy percent of the electoral 
vote.  This is the contingency theory that had Lincoln not won that election due to the Northern 
military successes on the battlefield; then the Confederacy would have a peace settlement.39 
The summer of 1864 was a decisive moment in Civil War history. Military success on the 
battlefield led to political success at the home front. It helped to ensure the reelection of 
President Abraham Lincoln and the successful conclusion of the war. These events are centered 
on the theory of contingency, that the South had opportunities to win a psychological victory 
over the North. Contingency theory in the summer of 1864 hinged largely on two campaigns, the 
Battle for Atlanta and the Shenandoah Valley campaign. The fall of Atlanta was caused by the 
removal of General Joseph E. Johnston whose replacement John Bell Hood, destroyed his army 
in an unwise series of reckless assaults. Because of these two campaigns, the Northern victory in 
the following year was assured, and the South lost their will to fight. 
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SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND ANTEBELLUM LAW: 
MODIFICATIONS SUITED TO THE STATE AND MASTER CLASS 
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During the Antebellum period, the United States’ slave law began changing in both the North and 
the South.  On a state-by-state basis, laws were made, reformed, or removed to fit the time.  Some 
states began amending laws in ways that appeared to benefit the slave.  What the slaves and the 
slave-owners both knew though, and as historian Eugene Genovese claimed, was that “slave laws 
existed as a moral guide and an instrument for emergency use, although the legal profession and 
especially Southern judges struggled to enforce them as a matter of positive law; wherever 
possible, the authority of the master class, considered as a perfectly proper system of 
complementary plantation law, remained in effect.”1  However, as the North began moving on a 
more progressive path to reform, the South remained rooted in the sort of reactionary legal culture 
expected of the paternalistic, agricultural, slaveholder.  
In the slave South, the legal system that emerged during the Antebellum period was built 
on several different foundations.  These foundations of slavery were also the foundations of 
Southern culture, economy and overall way of life.  The South was built on an agricultural system 
designed to produce high-demand products for export outside of the southern United States.  To 
stay within the confines of an agricultural economy for the South, also meant in their view, staying 
within the system of slavery.  Since English common law did not recognize hereditary unfree labor, 
the master class saw that it needed laws that would protect their interests.  In fact, the complex 
Southern legal system was an extensive construct that balanced several interests.  These included: 
the control, obedience and submissiveness of slaves; economic interests or the investment amount 
in the slave and the desire in long-run profits; the interest in continuing the plantation-style system 
of the South; and the master class’ control over working class overseers, the poor, and other 
whites.2  It was these components that slave law of the Antebellum period attempted to meet.  With 
the lack of a unified government particular to the South as a whole, it was up to each individual 
state to establish and enforce this legal structure in the Southern slavery-state system. 
The South experienced several noticeable changes before and throughout the Antebellum 
period that instilled a new sense of anxiety in the master class.  Those who could afford large 
numbers of slaves found it more and more difficult to find slaves at prices they had paid in the 
past, due to the 1807 ban on the Atlantic Slave Trade.  In Georgia for example, the average price 
of a “prime field hand” rose from $450 dollars in 1800 to $1,650 in 1859, even as the average New 
York price of upland cotton dropped by almost twenty cents.3  As the cost of owning slaves 
increased, so did the importance of the slave himself. 
  Despite the rising price of owning a slave, slave sales continued to skyrocket in the years 
just after the War of 1812.  Around that time, the master class began to worry about the increasing 
percentage of the enslaved population.   In fact by 1860, four states had slaves accounting for more 
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than one-third of their total population.  In South Carolina, the number was as high as sixty 
percent.4  This essence of this type of economy contributed to a “social and economic class 
structure” that was based largely on wealth valued through the amount of slaves rather than amount 
of specie.5  The master class feared the increasing number of slaves, believed it to be a precursor 
to rebellion, and on occasion passed laws to limit the number of African-Americans.6 The master 
class began moving toward a new phase of plantation-style life with a more limited number of 
African-Americans, which historian Andrew Fede describes as the “mature plantation period.”7 
 Doing so meant limiting a master’s right to property, which was not something that the 
South was known for doing in order to maintain their socioeconomic system and the balance of 
interests in the Southern states.  Pro-slavery advocates attempted to focus their property rights 
argument down to two basic forms of property, realty and personalty.8  The South believed that 
slavery fell under the latter of these two categories, the criteria being that a slave was chattel, or 
moveable property.   
 However, it was also argued in the South that, due to the expensive nature of purchasing 
and owning a slave, it was a more valuable type of property than land or tools.  In the well-known 
A Treatise on Political Economy, Jean-Baptiste Say argued that “a nation, awake to its true interest, 
is careful…to husband its pecuniary bounty, where it is prodigal of distinction and authority.”9  In 
this case, the idea of the paternalistic father-figure remained prominent in the South for reasons of 
both social and economic stability.  The South wished to maintain its social order, while at the 
same time ensuring its economic success with the slaves responsible for its “pecuniary bounty.” 
 According to Genovese, the Antebellum South was made up of a “complementary system 
of complementary plantation law.”10  This essentially meant that all authority on the plantation 
resided in the master, which complimented both public law and police laws.  However, by the 
dawn of the Antebellum era, public law also implemented limits on slave abuse and violence on 
the part of the master.  In essence, this system was accepted as common law, but only up to a point.  
The Southern analysis of their own system was that there was no contradiction between owning 
an unpaid worker while at the same time, participating in a greater capitalist, trans-Atlantic 
marketplace.11  Political economists in the South combined the institution of slavery with their 
own analysis of the Southern master class to explain how they believed that planters in the 
Southern states were no different than capitalists in the North, on the grounds that they invested 
their resources into methods of production and attempted to maximize profits.12  They then used 
this to argue for a new industrial future for slavery and at the same time the maintenance of their 
current legal and socioeconomic status.   .    
In states like South Carolina, for example, industrial interests made some headway but only 
secondary to the maintenance of control over the plantation system.  However, if the South was 
able to maintain its economy with a low, stable amount of slaves, it might be possible to develop 
a system that functioned with fewer numbers of slaves to the point where the cost of rearing slaves 
was higher than the market price, in which case the opportunity costs associated with slavery would 
be too high and the system could collapse economically.13 
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 This all falls under Genovese’s theory of a complimentary legal system and the premise of 
free trade, which comes with economic consequences in and of itself.  Georgia planter W.W. 
Hazard, for instance, told his newly acquired slaves how the state was legally required to take care 
of them at any age, and that he faced limits on what he could to in regards to harming them.  Instead 
of using the law to assure his slaves of their own safety, he was really using it to try and convince 
them they were well-off.  In reality, of course, ensuring the enforcement of state laws that actually 
countered the interests of the master class became an increasingly arduous task.14 
 Kentucky planter Henry Clay questioned even these weak laws imposed on masters and 
the internal slave trade.  Clay, normally an advocate of federal power, insisted that regulation or 
abolition was not a legitimate method of control but rather a systematic “annihilation” of the 
institutions of free trade and slavery.15  Clay believed that the federal courts did not have the 
constitutional right to regulate interstate trade regardless of what was being traded.  The goal for 
the South was not just to make a profit but to maximize it.  This is why the South argued so 
vehemently against the northern efforts at emancipation. 
Opponents of Clay, like anti-slavery evangelicals in the North, argued that God’s vision 
for the world could not possibly include a system like slavery.  In response, Southern evangelicals 
like Baptist Richard Fuller disputed this and welcomed slave-imposed “reforms,” saying that 
“religion allows no compromises with evil” (the evil in his view being the idea of straying from 
the institution of slavery which the North had done decades earlier).16  For the Southern argument, 
slavery was an ingrained concept, cemented into the legal and socioeconomic makeup of the 
plantation-style system of the South.  However, these legal and economic arguments were by no 
means the only types of justifications that the South used.  
 Religious idealism spread into the social aspect of the South as well, and ideas like the 
legal protection of human life existed within the social hierarchy.  In Fields v. State (Tennessee, 
1829), the clearly paternalistic attitude in a religious context had a bearing on the court’s decision.  
The judge’s decision read: “Christian nations do not consider themselves at liberty to sport away 
the lives of captives.”17  The judge ruled that the children of the nation were the slaves and the 
parents were the slaveholders.  This paternalistic attitude was also rooted in Jeffersonian idealism.  
Jefferson viewed slavery as a necessary evil despite owning more than one hundred slaves himself.  
The idea of being the benevolent father-figure existed in the South long after Jefferson’s death, 
despite the fact that no slaves saw it this way.   
 Religious paternalism was an Antebellum concept, but since 1618, the term “slave” had an 
understood rather than a defined meaning in any law books.18  Historian Thomas Morris describes 
slavery using five elements that always existed in the Southern system of slavery: claim of 
ownership, claim of alienability, claim of heritability, claim to product of labor, and a general 
rightlessness.19  The early lack of a legal definition, however, made the job of some of the earlier 
courts more difficult.  In New Orleans, Louisiana, the old French colonial code, referred to as the 
Black Code, existed to establish procedural safeguards and constraints.  However, it had nothing 
in it requiring jurors to seek the truth or justice in a case.  Rather, it required the jury to be made 
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up of free white males who owned slaves of their own.20  This Black Code was used in slave cases 
and even in some cases involving free blacks.  Courts often tried to work together from state to 
state, but in the end, the law really depended on what an individual judge believed best for his 
state.  Historian Christine Macdonald defines the right of jurisdiction as “the authority of a court 
to hear a dispute, to decide the outcome, and to articulate the reasons for its decision.”21  
In the 1802 case of Gobu v. Gobu, Judge John Lewis Tayler held that in North Carolina, 
being black was enough for the court to assume concurrent slave status.22  Not only could the judge 
summon an African-American to Court, but the court could then rule them a slave, especially in 
the absence of any proof to the contrary.  Race and status were at this point legally intertwined 
regardless of whether or not the individual held slave status by law.  It simply became another way 
that the master class could legally assert its authority. 
 Many Southern states started their own laws by building upon the pre-existing legal 
traditions of earlier cultures.  Specifically, they looked to laws of England, which had at one point 
controlled the original colonies and which took some of its own laws from the ancient Roman 
tradition.  One example of English law that extended into the Southern system was what was 
known as Hue-and-Cry Law.  Hue-and-Cry was an old English act requiring bystanders to yell out 
when they saw a runaway slave escaping and to in turn, pursue this slave until captured.  The 
Southern Antebellum equivalent of this was the practice of slave patrols.  In many cases, they were 
even more harsh or strict than the actual police force assigned to a specific town or city.23 
 Another of the South’s laws came from the English document the Magna Carta. This was 
called the “law of the land clause,” which limited the government’s power to regulate state 
constitutions.24  This way, the Federal Government had no authority to block the South’s control 
over their slaves.  Two other laws focused on the rights of a slave in regards to emancipation.  That 
is, what would the status of a freed slave’s family be in the eyes of the court?  Unless the entire 
family was purchased or given freedom by manumission, they by law would remain slaves.  
However, there were exceptions.  For instance, partus sequitir ventrem granted the unborn child 
of a freed pregnant slave its freedom as well.  This was seen as in futuro manumission or, 
manumission by future event.25  This, however, all changed if a slave that was due to be freed in 
the future was found guilty of a crime.  The final example of law extending from the Old English 
tradition was the idea of caveat emptor.  Caveat emptor means “let the buyer beware.”  In essence, 
it applied to slaves who had been sold: the buyer was getting whatever they appeared to be buying.  
There were even several newspapers that warned buyers of “stock” that looked good because of 
the legal condition caveat emptor.26  Caveat emptor would be upheld a number of times and 
applied to physical problems with a slave but not psychological ones.  If a buyer could prove that 
the slave was so mentally unfit that he or she could not work, and that this condition existed before 
the sale, then the original master could be held liable.27 
 A commonplace practice among slave owners was the hiring out of a slave to another 
master for a predetermined amount of time.  Masters “hired out or sold slaves when work was slow 
at home; they sent their slaves to market or distant plantations…and…if one party failed to live up 
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to his part of the deal and the other party suffered a loss, judges typically awarded damages for 
breach of contract.”28  These contracts were a way to hold both parties liable.  However, problems 
within these deals emerged on a regular basis, for quite obvious reasons. As Fede points out, “The 
slave owner’s interest in preserving the value of a hired slave clashed with the hirer’s interest in 
getting as much work out of the slave as possible during the period of hire.”29   
Finally, enforcement of these contracts was also difficult due to the fact that the South had 
weak central power at the state level across the board.  This was done to protect against infraction 
of the contra bonos mores principle (literally, against the good way of life) but it also led to a 
difficulty in Southern contract enforcement.30  The lack of a strong central authority usually meant 
the growth of smaller regional ones with less uniform laws that would vary from county to county 
and state to state.   
 In the judicial case of Spencer v. Pilcher (1837, Virginia), the judge declared that the 
“bailee” or hirer of a slave did not have the official rights of the master during the period of hire 
for that slave.31  If the slave was killed or died by some other mistreatment from the hirer, then the 
hirer himself was responsible.  However, if the slave ran away and could not complete the contract, 
it was grounds for the hirer to claim bad behavior on the part of the slave in which case it was the 
fault of the master.32 
 In almost any case across the South, it was an almost understood principle that the power 
of the master had to prevail.  This was because of a landmark decision in State v. Mann (1829, 
North Carolina) by Judge Thomas Ruffin.  Ruffin was a well-known supporter of slavery, so this 
decision was really no surprise.  He declared that the slave must at all times remain submissive to 
ensure the power, authority, and rights of the master above all else.33  This decision would carry 
across state lines of the South.  Yet despite this decision, judges did not rule that all whites in the 
South were on equal class footing.  The courts were usually more inclined to place economic 
burden of responsibility on the party more likely to be able to afford it.  However, if through 
connections and support, an upper class member of society was involved, they could often change 
the opinion of the jury and in turn shift the burden onto the lower class party.34   
 In was common knowledge and even law in the nineteenth century South, that a master 
was allowed to harm and even kill his slave for various legally “qualified” reasons.  However, 
there also were laws in place designed to protect a slave from abuse or mistreatment without due 
cause.  These laws were, of course extremely hard to enforce, despite the fact that they were in 
place not for the slave’s benefit but rather for the master’s, so that they would not suffer an 
economic loss from an injured or dead worker.35 This once again followed the legal principle in 
the South of contra bonos mores.  Many such laws were in place because of the fears of the slave-
owning class.  There were documented cases in which slaves who experienced abuse retaliated by 
harming or even killing their master or another white involved in the abuse.   
In a few cases, what was deemed as a “malicious” killing of a slave was not tolerated.  In 
Witsell v. Earnest (1818, South Carolina36), the judge recognized the conflict between “the 
requirement that slaves be controlled and the need to protect slaves from whites who the court 
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called ‘violent’ and ‘unthinking’ people of the community.”37  Eventually in 1821, the death 
penalty was implemented for such maliciousness.  If said maliciousness could be proved, it meant 
that in South Carolina at least, that simple monetary compensation for a killed slave by another 
white (not his or her master) was no longer considered proper or severe enough punishment.  That 
does not however mean that it still did not occur or that the law was not often overlooked in such 
cases.   
 In contrast, the law recognized that a runaway slave was a matter of private not public 
offense.38  According to Bird v. Wilkinson (1833, Virginia), if a master so chose, they could make 
the matter public.  Many cases involving runaway slaves also involved the process of slave 
transport by someone other than the original master.  If it could be proven that it was the fault of 
this other white or that they had allowed it intentionally for the purpose of emancipation, they 
could indeed be held liable.39  
As historian John Hope Franklin wrote, “physical handicap did not dissuade slaves from 
attempting to escape.”40  For the slave, the consequences of running away and being captured were 
high. It often made no difference whether the runaway in question was male or female, because 
neither was spared the lash, and so the South would turn to the aforementioned slave patrols, or a 
reward offered to the general public to increase the number of ordinary citizens, slave-owning and 
otherwise, who would actively search out runaways with the expressed goal of returning them to 
the master.41  Escape was one of the instances where a Southern court might find murdering a 
slave not only legally justified but warranted as well.   
 In cases where the slave was convicted of a crime, their testimony, or rather the validity of 
such a testimony, varied depending on state and time.  Legally, the rights of a slave were all but 
nonexistent under the master, however it was recognized in later Antebellum years that a slave had 
human intelligence even if he or she was still classified as chattel.42  Therefore in some less 
common cases toward the end of the Antebellum period, the courts were willing to look at the 
testimony of a slave.  In 1856, a New Orleans court recognized the testimony of two slaves against 
the word of another slave.43  It is important to note again here the later date of this case.  It was 
also the testimony of a slave against another slave.  In cases where a slave was involved in a crime 
against another slave, the courts were more willing to hear and consider the testimony of slaves.  
Slaves’ names and directions for what to do with those slaves were abundant in Southern 
property deeds and especially in final wills.  In some cases, masters would grant manumission to 
a slave upon their death in a will.  Walter Johnson notes that manumission was defined as “the 
right to grant slaves their freedom…posed between the privileges of property and the demands of 
public policy.”44  Manumission would be granted in almost every case to ensure the will was 
carried out properly.  If the state went against the direction of the will, they would in turn be going 
against the will and authority of the master and usurping their own laws and the core principle of 
Southern slavery.  In some cases, a master would promise their slave manumission in the will but 
could not put that into a contract due to the fact that slaves could not legally be allowed to enter 
into a contract. Rather, the master represented these obligations and actions in some sort of 
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agreement or transaction.  This action was upheld in the case of Stevenson v. Singleton (1829, 
Virginia), continuing the barring of slaves from contracted arrangements.45 There were cases, 
though, where slaves could be sold off despite manumission in a will, if the master owed anyone 
money from outstanding debts.  
 In the case of Morris v Owen (1801, Virginia), a number of slaves were left to a widow by 
their original master.  She was granted the slaves for the remainder of her life and was then to do 
as she wished once she wrote her own will.  Her children, however, sued the widow for possession 
after the original master died.  The court denied the children ownership.  This was because the 
state of Virginia intended to keep the will and authority of the master and his dominion over his 
slaves intact, despite the protests of the surviving heirs of the master.46 
 The case of Kendall v. Kendall (1816, Virginia) followed with a similar result of Morris v. 
Owen, but took a different route to get there.  In this case, a will granted freedom for slaves upon 
the death of a master, but the master on his deathbed revoked this part of the will that granted 
manumission and instead wished not to free his slaves.  In this case the courts still recognized the 
intent and wishes of the master, but revoked the manumission present in the will itself.  The 
Virginia court saw the wishes of the master as more relevant than the will because he was altering 
the will before death.47 
 When looking at legal cases state by state, a general trend emerges.  Nearly every state saw 
an increasing number of cases involving slaves during the Antebellum period.  This increase was 
due in part to some of the social tensions evident between the North and South and part to the court 
decisions themselves that led to further tension between different members of society.  Not only 
did the codes and laws of the South permeate the years of the Antebellum era of American history, 
but the legacy of those Southern judges critically involved in the formation, upkeep, and alterations 
of these laws did so as well.  Wahl observes that besides upholding the doctrine of the dominion 
and authority of the master class, “by devoting considerable effort to preserving property rights in 
slaves, southern judges in fact left a legacy of legal doctrines that eventually served the interests” 
of the South as a whole in the era leading up to the Civil War.48  During the late Antebellum period, 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was signed into law by President Millard Fillmore.  This was 
followed ten years later by the election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency and the secession of 
South Carolina from the United States.49  These acts were a result of the culmination of the tensions 
between North and South to date.   
Ultimately, one of the greatest tensions between North and South existed in the Southern 
legal structure. “The changing law of white slave abusers represented the shifting accommodation 
of the interests of the white rulers,” writes Historian Andrew Fede, “…nothing more.”  Regardless 
of what law was passed, no calculations were ever made in regards to slave rights or benefits by 
any such Southern lawmaker. Rather, any unintended effects that benefitted the slave usually had 
evident motives, and were simply a by-product of the South attempting to strengthen its hand in 
the ever-growing conflict with the North.50  The legal structure of the Southern states leading up 
to the Civil War was designed to defend the social, economic, and political position of the South. 
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Because of this legal system, the socially ingrained ideals that one would consider to be an 
identifying factor of a Southern citizen remained intact throughout the Antebellum period.  Indeed, 
nearly every Southern slaveowner in the years leading up to and during the Civil War would have 
advocated for slavery using a variety of justifications from paternalism and the Jeffersonian 
idealism associated with the early Antebellum period, all the way to slavery’s potential impact to 
a possible future of industrialization, increased production, and on the Southern socioeconomic 
system.  
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CHURCH, STATE, AND THE LEMON TEST: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT WHEN DECIDING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES 
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The Establishment Clause in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution has been the 
subject of contentious debate. Advocates for a strict separation of church and state believe that it 
should be broadly interpreted, while critics think that it should be interpreted narrowly. The U.S. 
Supreme Court invented the Lemon test in its decision in Lemon vs. Kurtzman (1971) in order to 
provide clear guidance for establishment clause cases. The Lemon test set the standard for 
determining government entanglement with religion for over a decade after its creation. However, 
beginning in the 1980s, arguments that the test provided an overly broad interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause began to impact its use. The Lemon test’s absence has led to Supreme Court 
decisions that have slowly eroded the wall of separation between church and state. Justices have 
tried to create new tests, but they have been unable to replicate the success of Lemon. 
Justices have increasingly relied on subjective reasoning that has contradicted past 
precedent and further obscured the boundary between church and state. Their conflicting 
interpretations of the Establishment Clause have created questions about their abilities as decision 
makers. Justices’ personal biases and ideological differences can create errors in judgment thus 
having the potential to influence their decisions, making tests, like Lemon, essential for 
interpreting the Constitution. The Lemon test provides a clear and concise method that is essential 
for ensuring that the government and the Supreme Court adhere to a strict set of rules for 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Analysis of the Court’s decision making in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman (1971), Marsh v. Chambers (1983) and Lee v. Weisman (1992) highlights the strength 
of the Lemon test when it is used and reveals the shortcomings of Establishment Clause 
interpretation without it. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) established a comprehensive 
approach for the Justices to use in Establishment Clause cases. The Court ruled 8-1 that 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island violated the First Amendment by providing public funds to private 
religious schools.1 The Court, led by Chief Justice Burger, devised a three-prong approach to 
determine if the states violated the Clause. The first prong of the test held that a statute must have 
a secular legislative purpose; the second, “the principle or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion;” and third, “the statute must not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”2 Burger relied heavily on the third prong of the test when delivering 
the majority opinion. In his analysis he found that since the teachers were employed by religious 
organizations and were a part of a system that placed religious ideas in the minds of children, a 
teacher would find it difficult to navigate the line between secular and religious intent.3 In order 
to prevent an excessive entanglement of church and state, both state governments would be forced 
to oversee the schools to make sure teachers did not incorporate religious ideas into the curriculum.   
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The lone dissenting opinion of Justice Byron R. White was influenced by his personal 
beliefs and highlights the errors in judgment that the Lemon test was created to prevent. White 
found fault in the Court’s decision to strike down the Rhode Island statute because he believed no 
evidence existed that teachers engaged in non-secular activities with their students.4 His reasoning 
is misguided because over two-thirds of the teachers were Catholic nuns and religious instruction 
was permitted.5 Even if secular teachings were a part of the curriculum, the schools were still 
sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church, which promotes learning through religious doctrine. 
Justice White continued his opinion by stating that he “cannot hold that the First Amendment 
forbids an agreement between the school and the State that state funds would be used only to teach 
secular subjects.”6 White’s subjective interpretation came into complete conflict with the 
Establishment Clause. The Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes violated the First Amendment 
because the laws respected a religious establishment. White’s flawed opinion emphasizes how 
incorporating a structured test, like Lemon, is essential for preventing a Justice’s personal bias 
from influencing his or her interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 
Despite the Lemon test’s effectiveness at countering the partiality of some Supreme Court 
Justices, critics believe that the test is flawed. Law author William B. Petersen argues that one of 
the biggest pitfalls of the test is “its assumption that a religious purpose, by itself, renders a statute 
unconstitutional.”7 He proposes that if a law is passed that has a religious purpose, it should not 
automatically be deemed unconstitutional because religious purpose does not necessarily lead to 
religious effect. Peterson exemplifies his point by suggesting that laws against murder and theft 
should be unconstitutional because those ideas are found in religious holy books.8 Peterson’s 
reasoning is flawed since laws against murder and theft have been included in secular governments 
prior to the creation of any popular holy texts. Religious organizations certainly do not hold a 
monopoly on human morality.  
Peterson’s argument misses the importance of the Lemon test’s religious purpose prong by 
overlooking the implications of a statute that supports the purpose of one religion over another. If 
a law is passed with the purpose of favoring one religion, it infringes on the First Amendment 
rights of those that practice all others. The design of the Lemon test not only prevents entanglement 
with church and state, it stops religious organizations from influencing what should be a secular 
government open to all religions. Contrary to the belief of some critics, the Lemon test does not 
restrict religious freedom. The test defends the free exercise of religion by ensuring a single 
religious faith is not valued over others. The test is extremely important for finding distinctions 
between purpose and effect, especially when the religious rights of all faiths are on the playing 
field. Failure to do so can result in Supreme Court decisions that are decided based on biased 
opinions, rather than on a structured test that arrives at an objective conclusion. 
In Marsh v. Chambers (1983) the Court did not use the Lemon test, and their decision 
emphasizes the problems that arise from not using it in establishment clause cases. The question 
laid out before the court asked if the State of Nebraska violated the Establishment Clause by paying 
a chaplain to lead a prayer before a legislative session. In a 6-3 decision the Court ruled that it did 
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not. In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote that “The opening of sessions of legislative and 
other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this 
country.”9 Burger stresses that because chaplains opening legislative sessions with prayer has been 
an historically integral part of the United States, it does not violate the Establishment Clause. He 
concludes that “this unique history led us to accept the interpretation of the First Amendment 
draftsman who saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer 
similar to that now challenged.”10 Burger’s conclusion was not based on the Constitution and 
instead relied on his subjective interpretation of the country’s history.  
Both Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined together in dissent 
against the Court’s opinion and found that the ruling was in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
In his dissent, Brennan declared that “every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of 
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years,” which the Court did not do.11 
Chief Justice Burger and the other concurring Justices completely ignored using the Lemon Test 
when forming their decisions and instead relied on historical context. Since Congressional 
Chaplaincies have been a part of the legislative process for much of the history of the United States, 
they believed that they did not violate the First Amendment. 
 Analysis of relevant past Supreme Court decisions is important because it provides helpful 
context that Justices can use to formulate their own opinions. Completely ignoring the Lemon test 
led to the possibility of setting a precedent where past decisions no longer matter. In regard to the 
practice of legislatures hiring chaplains, if the Court decided to make use of the Lemon Test, 
Justice Brennan asserted that “it would have to strike it down as a clear violation of the 
Establishment Clause.”12 Brennan’s conclusion emphasizes the need for the Court to use a 
structured test like Lemon when forming their opinions. 
The Court’s decision in Marsh v. Chambers relied on questionable reasoning that created 
new precedent against the Establishment Clause. Legal scholar Jeremy G. Mallory notes that the 
chaplain appointed for prayer in Chambers was from one religious denomination, payment for the 
chaplain came from public funds and no analysis of what the prayers said was conducted.13 If the 
Lemon test was used, all three of these points would have shown a clear violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Chief Justice Burger’s use of historical context to justify legislative prayer 
contains serious faults. The fact that chaplains have led prayers since the founding of the United 
States does not mean it is protected by the Constitution. Using the same reasoning, one could 
defend the constitutionality of slavery by arguing that it was a historically long-standing tradition 
since the establishment of the country. Even though slaves were an American tradition it does not 
make their use moral or constitutional. Suggesting that tradition holds more importance than the 
Constitutional misses the whole reason for the document in the first place. 
The Court’s decision in Chambers incorrectly held legislative chaplaincies as an exception 
to the First Amendment. Chaplains engaging with politicians during legislative sessions clearly 
demonstrates an interaction between church and state. Mallory asserted that a distinction should 
be made between situated and rotating chaplains. He wrote that the situated chaplain in Marsh was 
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reappointed for good job performance, leading the Supreme Court to believe that, “there was no 
impermissible motive involved in his sixteen year tenure.”14 In contrast, a rotating chaplain had 
less of an established relationship with the legislative body and had “less incentive to deal with the 
pluralistic nature of [the] congregation.”15 The degree to which a situated or rotating chaplain had 
the potential to violate the Establishment Clause is insignificant when the very act of incorporating 
a spokesperson for any religion into the legislative process violates the Constitution. A chaplain 
that associates with the legislative process, even indirectly, threatens secular government. Arguing 
that legislators who reappoint a chaplain due to his secular tendencies should only raise questions, 
not answers.  
In Lee v. Weisman (1992) the Supreme Court left out the Lemon test again in favor of a 
Coercion test. The Court considered whether conducting prayer during a high school graduation 
is constitutional. In a 5-4 decision the Justices ruled that religious exercise at the graduation service 
did in fact violate the Establishment Clause. The principal of the school provided a copy of 
guidelines that the rabbi had to follow in an effort to make his prayers nonsectarian.16 Justice 
Kennedy argued that because the principal was an employee of the state, he violated the 
Establishment Clause by controlling the religious content of the prayer, even if it was in an attempt 
to be secular. Kennedy wrote that “the undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and 
control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on 
attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the Invocation 
and Benediction.”17 Kennedy feared that students would be coerced to participate in a religious 
practice even if went against their own beliefs. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices Scalia, White and Thomas dissented against 
the Court’s opinion and its argument of coercive intent. Scalia believed that the Court’s opinion 
was flawed because it relied too heavily on the idea of coercion violating the Establishment 
Clause.18 In his dissent he wrote that “The Court's argument that state officials have ‘coerced’ 
students to take part in the invocation and benediction at graduation ceremonies is, not to put too 
fine a point on it, incoherent.”19 The use of coercion relies on slippery slope reasoning because it 
is largely based on assumption and not on hard evidence.  
Legal scholar Suzanna Sherry correctly points out the issues that the Court ran into by 
ignoring the Lemon test. She writes that, “the majority opinion relied entirely on the coercive 
aspect of the setting; he [Justice Kennedy] cobbled together a majority by studiously ignoring 
Lemon.”20 Unlike the Lemon test, a test for coercion is based on a Justice’s subjective 
interpretation that can be influenced by personal bias. Sherry argues that adopting the coercion test 
narrowed interpretation of the Establishment Clause while simultaneously creating an environment 
where “equal accommodation of religion nor equal indifference to religion is mandated. Instead, 
an unrestricted majority is authorized to indulge in discriminatory preferences.”21 By substituting 
a coercion test for most of the Lemon test, the Court established further precedent that impaired 
future Establishment Clause interpretation. 
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While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was flawed, it still contained some principles of 
the Lemon test within it. Kennedy determined that the principal, as an employee of the state, 
violated the Establishment Clause by actively working to incorporate prayer into graduation. The 
State was in fact entangled with religion and violated the entanglement prong of the Lemon test. 
Kennedy wrote that, “the principal chose the religious participant, here a rabbi, and that choice is 
also attributable to the State.”22 Kennedy had enough evidence to show an entanglement with 
church and state without needing to use the coercion argument. 
The cases Marsh v. Chambers (1983) and Lee v. Weisman (1992) show that the Supreme 
Court’s failure to adhere to a consistent test for determining Establishment Clause cases has further 
obscured interpretation of the First Amendment. In Chambers the Court used historical context to 
justify the employment of chaplains within state and national legislatures, thereby disregarding the 
Lemon test that would have surely found paid chaplains in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
In Weisman the Court abandoned the test again by attempting to introduce a coercive test to 
determine if prayer was constitutional. The coercive test was not an improvement over Lemon and 
instead raised more questions than answers. Even though the test could have provided clear utility 
in these cases, some Justices believed that the test was not good enough.23 Even Chief Justice 
Burger, the creator of the test has said that “Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper capable of 
resolving every Establishment Clause issue.”24 Others think that Supreme Court decisions 
involving the Clause have become unpredictable even with the structure the test provides. Despite 
the criticism against Lemon, not using it completely has shown why a structured test is needed. 
The conflicting decisions in Marsh and Lee demonstrates the inconsistencies that arise 
when the Court rules on prayer cases without implementing Lemon. Legal Scholar Bruce P. 
Merenstein emphasizes that these two rulings created an exception for prayer in other contexts, 
such as at school board meetings. In Marsh the Supreme Court used historical context to determine 
that legislative prayer was constitutional and found school board prayer the same. Merenstein 
believes this ruling to be flawed and suggests that a decision based on historical constitutional 
analysis, fails “to acknowledge that social, cultural and material conditions change dramatically 
over decades, let alone over centuries.”25 In Lee, the Supreme Court employed the coercion test in 
its decision and used the same principles that would find school board prayer unconstitutional. 
Since these decisions still stand, the constitutionality of school board prayer is in limbo. 
Merenstein argues that “were the Court to come to the conclusion that prayer at a public-school 
board meeting is unconstitutional, it would be adhering to a half-century of consistent 
jurisprudence in the area of religion and public schools.”26 If the Lemon test had been used in both 
cases, school board prayer would certainly have been found unconstitutional. 
Studies looking at the history of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Establishment Clause 
cases, have shown that they have ruled consistently when using the Lemon test. Political scholar 
Joseph A. Ignagni gathered statistical data from the era of the Burger Court that displays their 
accuracy and consistency when using the Lemon test. Ignagni’s findings showed that out of the 92 
decisions the Burger Court decided, 63 were found to be in violation of the Establishment Clause 
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while 29 were not.27 Ignagni writes that, “These cases are not as conflicting, confused, or 
unpredictable as some legal scholars have claimed . . . most of the decisions can be explained and 
predicted in a consistent matter.”28 His works shows the importance of the Lemon tests as a tool 
for guiding the Justices to make accurate and correct decisions. 
A similar study conducted by Herbert M. Kritzer and Mark J. Richards analyzed cases 
involving Establishment Clause jurisprudence in an attempt to see how influential the Lemon test 
has been on the Court’s opinion deciding those cases. Kritzer and Richards tested their hypothesis 
by creating tables of data that reflect the ruling of Justices when deciding Establishment Clause 
cases ranging from Everson v. Board of Education (1947) to Mitchell v Helms (2000).  Their 
findings show that the Lemon test has “served to provide the framework for the decisions in 
Establishment Clause cases decided for over the last 30 years.”29 The framework has stayed in 
place in part because Justices have tried and failed to create a method that improves on the 
precedent the Lemon test has already established. More importantly the data shows that the Court 
has ruled consistently on Establishment Clause cases when Lemon was in use, contradicting critics 
that say the test has created an unpredictable environment for decisions involving the Clause.  
 A fundamental aspect of the Lemon test is its ability to prevent Justices from incorporating 
their own political and ideological beliefs in decisions.  As Ignagni rightly points out, a Justice is 
not prevented from “voting compatibly with his or her personal policy preferences.”30 They do not 
face the same scrutiny that elected government officials experience. They do not have to worry 
about being reelected to the Court and being accountable to voters. Therefore, Justices can make 
decisions that may not necessarily match what the greater society views as acceptable. A more 
liberal minded Court may over step its bounds and infringe on religious liberty while a more 
conservative minded court may vote in favor of upholding a decision that might entangle the state 
with religion. Legal Scholar David M. Beatty argues that “religious liberty is better protected and 
democracy more respected when judges move past the interpretive phase of the review process 
and take a close, hard look at the facts.”31 They should put their own political and personal beliefs 
in the background when interpreting the constitutionality of a case. Failure to do so can result in 
decision that is not only wrong but also hinders the jurisprudence that will be needed to decide 
cases in the future. The Lemon test is critical for ensuring that Justices follow the Constitution and 
not their personal political leanings. 
The Justices are human beings, which means that they have limitations that can impede the 
reliability of Supreme Court decisions. Psychologist and political scientist Herbert A. Simon 
conducted extensive research on the limits of human computing power and rationality. His findings 
showed that by taking into account the limitations of knowledge and power of human beings, one 
will find that they are incapable of “making objectively optimal decisions . . . but if they use 
methods of choice that are as effective as decision making and problem-solving permit, we may 
speak of procedural or bounded rationality.”32 Simon suggests through his research that human 
decision making is limited to the amount of information one knows when forming a conclusion. 
When his theory is applied to the Justices it explains how and why they have come to decisions 
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that do not always work within the context of the constitution and society as a whole. Each Justice 
comes from a different background and life experience that influences his or her decision making. 
The absence of a test that balances subjective reasoning with objective truth can be detrimental to 
Court rulings. The Lemon test is a way to counter the limits of human rationality, by incorporating 
set principles that help the Court come to a correct decision.   
The sheer volume of cases the Supreme Court takes can also hinder its opinions. Joseph A. 
Ignagni found that the case load of the Court has increased dramatically over the decades. In 1930, 
1,039 cases were docketed for the Court to hear, growing from 5,144 in 1980, all the way to 
between 7,000 and 8,000 in 2016.33 Out of the thousands of cases, the Court only hears oral 
argument for about 80 per term. Their massive workload illustrates the unrealistic expectations 
placed on the Justices. Due to the extensive case load that they preside over, their ability to remain 
impartial in decision making diminishes. It causes stress and can make Justices form conclusions 
that may not have been reached in a reasoned matter. Due to this immense burden, Ignagni believes 
that the “Justices must often rely upon a simple decision-making structure.”34 When coupled with 
Simon’s theory on the limits of human rationality, Supreme Court decisions absent of a core set of 
determined principles can inhibit the accuracy of their decisions. Ignagni emphasizes that Justices, 
“do not have the time, resources, or intellectual capacity to make all of their decisions in a more 
comprehensive manner.”35 A refined tests such as the Lemon test can help relieve the stress and 
burden placed on Justices during the decision-making process.  
In addition to providing a solid foundation for deciding Establishment Clause cases, the 
Lemon test also assists Justices in forming more objective opinions that are less influenced by their 
own political leanings. The test was created by the Court of a need to make better decisions when 
deciding Establishment Clause cases. Despite its value in Establishment Clause cases, it has not 
escaped criticism or attempts to remove its use completely from the Court. Critics of the Lemon 
test have unsuccessfully reduced the importance of Lemon, yet Justices have decided to try and 
rule Establishment Clause cases without using it. 
Lastly, the sheer volume of work the Justices are responsible for makes utilizing a test 
essential for providing correct opinions on cases. Data has shown that when the Lemon test is in 
use, the Supreme Court has ruled consistently concerning Establishment Clause cases. A test also 
helps to remove political opinions that can arise among Justices when deciding cases by declaring 
a clear set of principles that reflect the words of the Constitution. It also helps Justices make correct 
decisions despite the limits of the human brain. Justices are not computers that can make precise 
calculations without corruption, they are people that are influenced by forces in and outside of the 
Court room.  
The precedent set by the Lemon test continues to indirectly influence the Supreme Court 
to this day. When in use, the test has the ability to correctly determine violations of the Clause 
without the need for other tests. It provides a clear and concise method for Justices to use without 
relying on political leanings or limitations of the Justices. The perceived short comings of decisions 
regarding the Clause do not lie with the Test but rather with the Justices. By abandoning a 
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structured way to rule on Establishment Clause cases, the Court risks undermining the principles 
set by the Founding Fathers and eroding the wall between church and state further. 
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